GR L 17482; (March, 1966) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-17482 March 31, 1966
GENOVEVA R. JABONETE, ET AL., plaintiffs, vs. JULIANA MONTEVERDE, ET AL., defendants, ANTONIO LEGASPI, respondent-appellant, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee, MRS. LUZ ARCILLA, petitioner-intervenor-appellee.
FACTS
On March 11, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Davao, in Civil Case No. 824, ordered defendant Antonio Legaspi to demolish a portion of his corral that blocked the plaintiffs’ access to a pathway and declared the plaintiffs’ right to use a 3-meter wide pathway for their vehicles and repair shop. Legaspi appealed. On May 21, 1954, the lower court granted discretionary execution, and the plaintiffs opened an opening in Legaspi’s fence. Legaspi moved for reconsideration. Subsequently, the parties entered into an amicable agreement, embodied in a court order dated May 24, 1954. The agreement stipulated, among other things, that Legaspi would permit the plaintiffs, their family, friends, drivers, servants, and jeeps to use his private road, and the plaintiffs would open a 4-meter wide door in the fence at their own cost. Both parties complied, and Legaspi abandoned his appeal. In December 1959, the plaintiffs transferred their repair shop elsewhere, and Legaspi reconstructed his fence, closing the opening. The plaintiffs’ lot was later foreclosed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which then conditionally sold it to Mrs. Luz Arcilla. When Arcilla demanded the re-opening of the fence to build a house and Legaspi refused, DBP filed a petition to hold Legaspi in contempt, which Arcilla later joined. The lower court found Legaspi guilty of contempt for defying its March 11, 1954 decision, fined him P100, and ordered him to open the pathway.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent-appellant, Antonio Legaspi, was guilty of contempt of court for refusing to re-open the pathway after the plaintiffs’ successors-in-interest (DBP and Mrs. Arcilla) demanded it.
RULING
No, the order finding Legaspi guilty of contempt is reversed. The Supreme Court held that the order of May 24, 1954, which embodied the parties’ amicable agreement, superseded and modified the decision of March 11, 1954. The easement of right of way granted under the May 24, 1954 order was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code, strictly limited to the original plaintiffs, their family, friends, drivers, servants, and jeeps. It was not a predial servitude intended to pass to the plaintiffs’ successors-in-interest. Therefore, Legaspi’s refusal to extend the easement to DBP and Mrs. Arcilla did not constitute defiance of the March 11, 1954 decision (which was no longer subsisting) or the May 24, 1954 order (under which the successors had no right). The servitude was personal and granted without compensation to Legaspi, further indicating its personal nature.
