GR L 17468; (July, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-17468; July 31, 1963
PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, MARIANO V. DEL ROSARIO and SALVADOR V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Quezon City, Branch III, SANCHO R. JACINTO and DOMINGO BASCARA, respondents-appellees.
FACTS
Respondents Sancho R. Jacinto and Domingo Bascara, as registered owners, filed a forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 5039) in the Municipal Court of Quezon City against petitioners Pilar T. del Rosario, et al. Petitioners, in their answer, claimed ownership and prior physical possession of the disputed lands, alleging purchase from Macaria Fulgencio. Subsequently, petitioners filed an amended answer containing a “third-party complaint” against the plaintiffs (Jacinto and Bascara) and against the previous registered owner, J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., praying for damages. The municipal court denied admission of this third-party complaint. Meanwhile, petitioners initiated a separate action for “reconveyance and/or recovery” of the same properties in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They then filed a motion in the municipal court to suspend the forcible entry proceedings pending the outcome of the reconveyance case. The municipal court denied this motion to suspend.
ISSUE
The primary issues are whether the municipal court committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) denying admission of the third-party complaint; and (2) denying the motion to suspend the forcible entry proceedings.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and mandamus, finding no abuse of discretion by the lower courts. Regarding the third-party complaint, the Court held its admission was discretionary. The complaint was improper against the plaintiffs Jacinto and Bascara, as claims against them should have been presented as a mere counterclaim within the same answer. As to J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., the alleged compromise agreement was extraneous to the sole issue of material possession in the summary ejectment proceeding. Any claim for damages arising from that agreement should be litigated in a separate action to avoid cluttering the forcible entry case. The municipal court correctly exercised its discretion in denying its admission.
Concerning the motion to suspend proceedings, the Court ruled it was properly denied. The action for reconveyance, filed after the ejectment suit was initiated, appeared dilatory. Critically, the issue of title in the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the determination of prior physical possession in the summary action. Forcible entry cases are designed to provide a speedy remedy for possession, and their proceedings should not be delayed by collateral actions involving claims of ownership. The Court noted a pattern of dilatory tactics by petitioners, having filed multiple other special civil actions seeking to suspend the ejectment case, all previously dismissed. The appealed order was affirmed to put an end to this litigious rigmarole.