G.R. No. L-17191; July 30, 1962
JOSE PEREZ CARDENAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO CAMUS, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On May 26, 1941, appellant Pedro Camus, with appellee Jose Perez Cardenas as solidary guarantor, executed a promissory note in favor of Jose Garrido. Upon their default, Garrido filed an action (Civil Case No. 21439) against both. Appellant could not be served with summons, so the case proceeded solely against appellee, who was held liable. Appellee paid the judgment debt in full. He then demanded reimbursement from appellant. In September 1958, the parties agreed on a repayment schedule, but appellant defaulted after three installments. Appellee consequently filed the present action to recover the amount he paid, plus damages and attorney’s fees.
Appellant filed an answer raising affirmative defenses, including improper venue and bar by prior judgment due to appellee’s failure to file a cross-claim in the prior case. The court set the case for trial on March 22, 1960. Just four days before trial, appellant filed a motion to dismiss reasserting his defenses and a motion for continuance. He scheduled the hearing for his motion to dismiss for March 26, 1960—four days after the trial date. At the trial on March 22, appellant did not appear. The lower court denied his motion for continuance, received appellee’s evidence ex parte, and rendered judgment in appellee’s favor. Appellant appealed, contesting the denial of his motions and the court’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in: (1) proceeding to trial without first resolving the motion to dismiss; (2) denying the motion for continuance; and (3) assuming jurisdiction despite an alleged improper venue.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The denial of the motion for continuance was proper. Granting such a motion is discretionary, and the circumstances indicated it was a dilatory tactic. Appellant had filed his answer months earlier but waited until just before trial to file his motions. By setting his motion to dismiss for a date after the scheduled trial, he attempted to force a postponement, which the court correctly refused.
Regarding the unresolved motion to dismiss, the Court held the trial court was not obligated to rule on it before trial. The motion was a mere reiteration of defenses already in the answer, and appellant’s scheduling maneuver did not bind the court to delay proceedings. On the substantive grounds, the motion lacked merit. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, not by a defendant’s defenses. The claim of improper venue was thus unsubstantial. The defense of bar by prior judgment also failed because appellant could not be summoned in the prior case; appellee was not at fault for failing to file a cross-claim against an unavailable co-defendant. Therefore, the trial court validly proceeded with the trial and correctly decided the case on its merits.