G.R. No. L-17185. February 28, 1964.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. GSIS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

FACTS

The GSIS Employees’ Association filed a case with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) concerning twenty-one demands, which led to a strike in 1953. The CIR rendered a judgment on June 29, 1959, granting certain salary increases and family allowances. On July 6, 1959, the GSIS filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration, questioning the CIR’s jurisdiction, the scope of the salary increases, and the grant of family allowances. The CIR, on August 13, 1959, issued an order clarifying that its recognition of collective bargaining did not compel agreement on terms fixed by law and that the granted salary increases were separate from any other increases. The GSIS then moved to have its motion heard en banc.
On March 14, 1960, the CIR en banc issued a resolution denying GSIS’s motion. It held that a motion for clarification does not suspend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. Consequently, it deemed only the specific issue on family allowance as properly submitted for en banc review. The GSIS filed its notice of appeal to the Supreme Court on July 22, 1960, and the petition for review on July 26, 1960.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the GSIS’s appeal was filed on time, given its prior filing of a motion for clarification.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. The Court ruled that a motion for clarification of a judgment or order does not toll or suspend the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or for taking an appeal. The CIR correctly held that the period to appeal began to run from the petitioner’s receipt of the original judgment on June 29, 1959. The subsequent motion for clarification, filed on July 6, 1959, did not interrupt this period. The CIR’s resolution of March 14, 1960, which denied the clarification motion, merely confirmed this procedural point.
Therefore, counting from March 14, 1960 (the date of the CIR en banc resolution) to July 22 and 26, 1960 (the dates of the notice of appeal and petition filing), more than four months had elapsed. This period far exceeded the statutory appeal periods provided under Section 1, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 875. Since the appeal was not perfected within the prescribed period, the judgment of the CIR had already become final and executory. The Court thus refused to delve into the substantive issues raised by GSIS, such as the CIR’s jurisdiction or the merits of the salary increases, due to the procedural default. The petition was dismissed.