G.R. No. L-17062; October 31, 1962
MARIANO S. RAMIREZ Y LOCSIN, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, as Judge of Branch III of the Municipal Court of Quezon City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., respondents.

FACTS

J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 5466) against Mariano Ramirez in the Municipal Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the trial, Ramirez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of First Instance (CFI) to challenge the proceedings, which was dismissed by Judge Nicasio Yatco for being an improper remedy, as appeal was available. No appeal was taken from this dismissal. Subsequently, in the forcible entry case, Ramirez and his counsel failed to appear at a scheduled hearing despite notice. The municipal court proceeded, received the plaintiff’s evidence, and later rendered a decision against Ramirez, ordering him to vacate. This decision became final as no appeal was perfected.
After the municipal court decision but before its finality, Ramirez filed a second petition for certiorari and prohibition (Sp. Civil Case No. Q-5030) in the CFI, seeking to annul the municipal court’s orders and suspend proceedings. Judge Yatco dismissed this second petition. Concurrently, after the judgment became final, Ramirez filed a separate petition for relief from judgment in another branch of the CFI, which was also dismissed. The present appeal concerns only the CFI’s orders dated March 2 and March 19, 1960, dismissing his second certiorari petition in Sp. Civil Case No. Q-5030.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Ramirez.

RULING

Yes, the dismissal was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the CFI’s orders. The writ of certiorari is governed by Rule 67, which requires that it may be invoked only when a tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the Municipal Court had exclusive original jurisdiction over the forcible entry case and had acquired jurisdiction over Ramirez’s person through his voluntary filing of an Answer. Any errors in its exercise of that jurisdiction, therefore, were merely errors of judgment, not jurisdiction, and were correctible by timely appeal.
The record shows that Ramirez had the remedy of appeal available to him from the municipal court’s decision in the forcible entry case. He, however, allowed that judgment to become final and executory. Certiorari cannot serve as a substitute for a lost appeal. The Court noted his counsel’s persistent but misguided litigation strategy in filing multiple actions, each employing the wrong remedy. The cited case of Mendez vs. Kiam was distinguished, as it involved a defaulting defendant, whereas Ramirez had participated in the trial by filing an Answer and cross-examining witnesses. Since the appeal was confined to the propriety of the certiorari dismissal, and the municipal court’s judgment on the merits was not appealed, the Supreme Court found no error in the CFI’s ruling.