GR L 16950; (December,1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16950, December 22, 1961
SIMEON T. GARCIA, petitioner-appellee, vs. ARTURO B. PASCUAL, Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, EULOGIO STA. MARIA, Municipal Treasurer of said municipality and the MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE, NUEVA ECIJA, respondents-appellants.
FACTS
Simeon T. Garcia, a civil service eligible, was appointed as Clerk of Court of the Justice of the Peace Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, by the acting justice of the peace on July 1, 1958. This appointment received approval from the Department of Justice and the Civil Service Commission. However, when Garcia submitted his vouchers for salary payment to the municipal treasurer, they were returned with the instruction to first secure approval from the municipal mayor. The mayor refused to approve the payment.
The mayor’s refusal was based on an opinion of the provincial fiscal, which held that Republic Act No. 1551 had repealed Section 75 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296). Section 75 specifically authorized justices of the peace in first-class municipalities to appoint their clerks of court, with salaries paid from municipal funds. In contrast, R.A. No. 1551 provided that all municipal employees paid from general funds shall be appointed by the municipal mayor upon recommendation of the corresponding chief of office.
ISSUE
Whether Republic Act No. 1551 repealed Section 75 of the Judiciary Act, thereby transferring the power to appoint the clerk of court of the justice of the peace from the justice of the peace to the municipal mayor.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling that R.A. No. 1551 did not repeal Section 75 of the Judiciary Act. The legal logic rests on three key principles. First, the Court emphasized the constitutional principle of an independent judiciary. Justices of the peace, like other judges, are appointed by the President to ensure judicial independence. This independence would be undermined if subordinate court personnel were subject to appointment by a local executive official like the municipal mayor.
Second, the Court applied the rule of statutory construction that a prior special law is not repealed by a subsequent general law unless repeal is expressly stated or arises by necessary implication. Section 75 of the Judiciary Act is a specific provision governing appointments to a particular office within the judicial branch. R.A. No. 1551 is a general statute concerning municipal employees, primarily those in the executive and legislative branches. There is no express repeal, and no necessary implication of repeal exists, as the two laws can be reconciled by limiting the application of the general law to municipal offices outside the judiciary.
Third, the Court gave great weight to the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, who, as the government’s chief legal adviser, had previously opined that no repeal had occurred. This administrative interpretation supported the conclusion that the justice of the peace retained the appointing power. Therefore, Garcia’s appointment was valid, and the municipal officials were ordered to approve his vouchers and pay his salary.