GR L 16864; (April, 1962) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16864; April 18, 1962
VALDERRAMA LUMBER MANUFACTURERS’ CO., INC., petitioner, vs. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Sala I, Court of First Instance of Davao, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO, FRANCISCO ANG, PABLO ALBIOS, JOHN DOE OR AVELINA CHAVES, respondents.
FACTS
In Civil Case No. 3125, the Court of First Instance of Davao held Valderrama Lumber Manufacturers’ Co., Inc. subsidiarily liable for damages arising from a vehicular collision caused by its driver, Perfecto Veras, who was found guilty of reckless negligence in a prior criminal case. The judgment ordered the corporation to pay the private respondents P29,683.32. The corporation received notice of this judgment on March 30, 1960.
On that same date, the prevailing parties filed a motion for immediate execution pending appeal, serving a copy on the corporation and setting the hearing for the very next day. The corporation opposed the motion, arguing it violated the three-day notice rule and was groundless. Respondent Judge Cusi, Jr. granted the motion, reasoning any appeal would be dilatory since the corporation’s defense was a “mere denial” unsupported by admissible evidence. Execution was levied on corporate logs worth P42,000, prompting the corporation to file this certiorari petition.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic proceeds from Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which permits discretionary execution before the expiration of the appeal period upon “good reasons” stated in a special order. The Court examined the lower court’s rationale—that the appeal appeared intended for delay given the petitioner’s weak defense consisting only of a bare denial and an irrelevant affidavit. This constituted a permissible, fact-based “good reason” within the trial court’s discretionary authority. The Court noted the procedural objection regarding the one-day notice was waived, as the petitioner actively opposed the motion on its merits during the hearing.
Crucially, the Court emphasized the petitioner had an adequate legal remedy it failed to utilize: filing a supersedeas bond to stay the execution, as expressly provided under the same Rule 39. The petitioner, while alleging solvency, never offered such a bond in the lower court. The absence of a clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge, coupled with the petitioner’s failure to avail itself of the specific statutory remedy, warranted denial of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. However, the Court balanced the equities by granting the petitioner a final opportunity to file a sufficient supersedeas bond within ten days from the finality of this decision to stay the execution; otherwise, the order would be implemented.
