GR L 16848; (February, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16848. February 27, 1963.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ENRIQUE MAGLANOC, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon and TIU SAN alias ANGEL GOMEZ, respondents.
FACTS
The Court of First Instance of Quezon granted Tiu San’s petition for naturalization on July 13, 1950. After the two-year probationary period, he petitioned to take his oath of allegiance. This was denied on June 3, 1953, because during the probationary period, he had been convicted of violating a municipal ordinance and fined P50.00. Tiu San’s appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on April 20, 1955 (G.R. No. L-7301), affirming the denial. On January 27, 1958, Tiu San filed a new petition, alleging he had received an absolute presidential pardon for that conviction on December 23, 1957. The trial court denied this petition and a subsequent motion for reconsideration.
On January 30, 1959, Tiu San filed yet another petition to take his oath. This petition remained unresolved. On February 22, 1960, he moved to set it for hearing, and respondent Judge Enrique Maglanoc issued an order setting a hearing date. The Republic then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing Tiu San’s repeated petitions were effectively petitions for relief from a final judgment, filed out of time.
ISSUE
What is the effect of the previous final denials of Tiu San’s petition to take his oath upon the original decision granting his naturalization?
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled for the Republic, annulling the respondent judge’s order and prohibiting further proceedings. The Court held that the final denial of Tiu San’s petition to take the oath, due to his conviction during the probationary period, nullified the original 1950 decision granting naturalization. As established in the Court’s prior resolution in G.R. No. L-7301 and in Isasi y Larrabide v. Republic, the failure to satisfy the requirements of the probationary period results in the loss of any rights under the naturalization decision, terminating the entire proceeding.
The absolute pardon granted in 1957 does not alter this result. A pardon does not operate retrospectively and cannot revive a judicial proceeding that has already been terminated. Since the denial of his oath-taking became final in 1955, the naturalization case was closed. Tiu San’s subsequent petitions were impermissible attempts to reopen a terminated case, not mere continuations of an executory decision. The Court also rejected Tiu San’s procedural objection regarding the State’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the lower court, finding the exception applicable as any objection would have been futile given the patent lack of jurisdiction to revive the ended proceeding.
