G.R. No. L-16836. January 30, 1962.
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., represented by GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., and HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, petitioners, vs. BIENVENIDO SANVICTORES, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is the registered owner of the Tatalon Estate under a Torrens title. Respondent Bienvenido Sanvictores occupies a portion, Lot 49, which he purchased in 1949 from Pedro Deudor, a claimant against the Tuason title. Litigation between Tuason and Deudor culminated in a 1953 compromise deed where Deudor recognized Tuason’s title, and Tuason agreed to compensate Deudor’s vendees, like Sanvictores, by allowing them to purchase their lots at current prices. In 1958, Tuason filed an ejectment action (accion publiciana, Civil Case No. Q-3519) against Sanvictores. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment on March 30, 1959, declaring Sanvictores without right to possess Lot 49 and ordering him to vacate. No appeal was taken, making the judgment final.
After a writ of execution was issued, Sanvictores obtained a 60-day suspension to negotiate. During this period, the parties bargained but failed to agree on a price. Six days before the suspension expired, Sanvictores filed a new case (Civil Case No. Q-4809) seeking to compel Tuason to sell him the lot at a fair price, invoking his alleged preferential right under the 1953 compromise. He then moved in the ejectment case for an indefinite suspension of execution, which was denied. Sanvictores then secured a writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals, which set aside the execution orders, ruling that the resolution of his preferential right in the new case was a prejudicial question that should hold the execution in abeyance.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly granted certiorari to suspend the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment case due to the pendency of a separate action by the defeated party to enforce an alleged preferential right to purchase the property.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The legal logic is clear. First, Sanvictores’ inaction for six years after the 1953 compromise and his failure to plead his alleged preferential right as a defense or compulsory counterclaim in the ejectment suit constituted a waiver and bar under Sections 6, Rule 10 and 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. His claim, being necessarily connected with the issue of possession, should have been raised in that action. The final judgment in the ejectment case thus precluded its later assertion to obstruct execution.
Second, the pendency of his separate action for specific performance (Case Q-4809) did not constitute a prejudicial question to the execution of the final ejectment judgment. A prejudicial question requires the prior resolution of an issue in one case upon which another case depends. Here, the ejectment case, which solely adjudicated possession, had already attained finality. The new action concerning title or a right to purchase was independent and irrelevant to the enforcement of the executed judgment for possession.
Finally, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the certiorari petition. The only question from the trial court’s denial of the suspension motion was one of law, not appealable to the Court of Appeals. Since certiorari can only be issued by that Court in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, its decision was null and void. Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that the very 1953