G.R. No. L-16827; January 31, 1963
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., represented by its Managing Partner Gregorio Araneta, Inc., plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE AGUIRRE, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the registered owner of the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision in Quezon City under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1267, filed an action to recover possession and damages against Jose Aguirre. The plaintiff alleged that in October 1951, Aguirre, through force, strategy, and stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied a 500-square-meter portion of its land, constructing a house thereon. Aguirre defended his possession, claiming he purchased the lot from one Agustin de Torres, a successor-in-interest of Telesforo Deudor, who allegedly held the land under an 1893 “informacion posesoria.” Aguirre further invoked a Compromise Agreement dated March 16, 1953, executed between Tuason and the Deudors in prior civil cases, arguing it granted rights to purchasers like him to either buy the lots or seek refunds.
The trial court ruled in favor of Tuason, ordering Aguirre to vacate the land, remove his constructions, and pay monthly compensation for its use. The court found Tuason’s registered title conclusive and held that Aguirre’s possession was unlawful. It reasoned that any rights under the Compromise Agreement were distinct from the immediate issue of possession and were contingent upon executing a formal contract to sell with the registered owner, which Aguirre had failed to do for over five years.

ISSUE

The sole legal issue is whether the registered owner, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., is entitled to recover possession of the disputed land from Jose Aguirre, who claims ownership derived from a separate source and asserts rights under a compromise agreement.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, ruling unequivocally in favor of the registered owner, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. The Court’s legal logic rests on the indefeasibility of the Torrens title and the settled jurisprudence surrounding this specific property. First, the validity of Tuason’s registered ownership, evidenced by a certificate of title issued in 1914, has been consistently upheld in a line of previous cases involving claims derived from the same Deudor source. The Court reiterated that such a registered title is no longer subject to collateral attack and has become incontrovertible. Aguirre presented no new facts to warrant a deviation from this established doctrine.
Second, the Court dismissed Aguirre’s ancillary arguments. The defense of prescription or laches is unavailing because, under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), no title to registered land can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the registered owner’s title. Third, the scope of the 1953 Compromise Agreement was limited to the parties thereto and those specifically enumerated in its annexes. There was no showing that Aguirre fell within this defined scope. Furthermore, any potential right to purchase under the agreement was separate from the right to present possession, which remained exclusively with the registered owner until a formal contract to sell was executed. Finally, the trial court’s factual finding that Aguirre’s entry was unlawful through “force, strategy and stealth” was binding, as the appeal raised only questions of law. Consequently, the ejectment order and the award for the reasonable value of the occupancy were fully justified.