G.R. No. L-16797. February 27, 1963.
Rodrigo Enriquez, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Socorro A. Ramos, et al., defendants-appellants.

FACTS

On November 24, 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Dizon sold eleven parcels of land in Quezon City to Socorro A. Ramos for P101,000. Ramos paid a P5,000 down payment, half in cash and half by check, and agreed to pay the P96,000 balance within ninety days. To secure this balance, Ramos mortgaged the eleven parcels to the vendors in the same deed of sale. As additional security, she also mortgaged another lot, Lot No. 409 of the Malinta Estate.
Due to Ramos’s failure to comply with the mortgage conditions, the vendors-mortgagees filed a foreclosure action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on April 29, 1959. Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the vendors had previously sued her in the Manila CFI on February 24, 1959, to recover the P2,500 paid by check, which she had stopped. She argued that since the mortgage debt was already demandable when the first suit was filed, the vendors had split a single cause of action, making the second suit subject to abatement under Rule 2, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

1. Did the vendors-mortgagees split a single cause of action by filing separate suits for the check amount and the mortgage foreclosure?
2. Did the trial court err in ordering payment and foreclosure without first setting a date of maturity for the obligation?

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding no merit in the appeal. On the first issue, the Court held there was no splitting of a cause of action. The first complaint in Manila was based on the distinct and separate obligation arising from the wrongful stopping of payment of the P2,500 check. The second complaint in Quezon City was for the non-payment of the secured P96,000 balance. These constitute two different causes of action. Furthermore, the mortgage was constituted on lands in Quezon City, and foreclosure could only be sought in the courts of that jurisdiction. Rule 2, Section 4, which prohibits splitting a single cause of action, therefore does not apply.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that the obligation had a fixed maturity date. The contract stipulated the P96,000 was “payable within ninety (90) days” from the date of the deed. The additional provision that the debt would bear 12% interest per annum in case of default was merely a penal clause to induce timely payment, not an indication that no period was fixed. Consequently, the trial court correctly ordered payment and foreclosure without needing to set another due date. The appealed decision was affirmed.