G.R. No. L-16786; October 31, 1961
EMILIANO M. PEREZ, as Chief of the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE CITY MAYOR, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD and the CITY TREASURER, all of the City of Cabanatuan, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Emiliano M. Perez, as Chief of the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital, filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. He sought to compel the City Mayor, Municipal Board, and City Treasurer of Cabanatuan City to appropriate and pay the sum of P24,983.12 from the city’s general fund to the provincial hospital. The petitioner anchored his claim on Section 2(a) of Republic Act No. 1939, the Hospital Financing Law, which obligates cities to appropriate at least 7% of their annual general income for the support of such hospitals. He alleged that for the fiscal year 1957-58, based on the city’s income of P555,700.00, the required contribution was P34,983.12, but the city only appropriated P10,000.00, leaving the stated deficiency.
The respondents filed their answer, and the case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings. The lower court dismissed the petition, ruling that the petitioner was not the real party in interest. Insisting on his right to bring the mandamus action, the petitioner appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Chief of the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital is the proper party to file an action for mandamus to compel Cabanatuan City to appropriate its statutory contribution for hospital support, or whether he failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, ruling that the petitioner was not the proper party to institute the action and had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. The legal logic is grounded on the specific statutory and regulatory framework governing the enforcement of contributions under the Hospital Financing Law (R.A. No. 1939). Section 7 of the law vests supervision and control in the Secretary of Health, including the power to promulgate implementing rules.
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of Health issued Circular No. 262. Section 3(c) of this circular explicitly provides the administrative remedy for a city’s failure to provide its contribution: the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Health and the Auditor General, shall order the withholding of the needed amount from the city’s share in the Internal Revenue allotments. The rule designates a specific course of action and identifies the superior executive officials empowered to initiate it. There is no provision authorizing a hospital chief to file a judicial action directly against the local government unit.
Consequently, the petitioner’s proper course was to report the city’s failure to his superior, the Secretary of Health, to initiate the administrative process. The record showed no such prior report or effort to avail of this plain, speedy, and adequate administrative remedy. The Court reiterated the settled doctrine that special civil actions like mandamus are not entertainable when superior administrative officers can grant relief, and judicial recourse is premature until all such administrative remedies have been exhausted. Therefore, the petitioner’s direct resort to the courts was improper.