G.R. No. L-16648. November 30, 1961. CENONA CAPA and SEGUNDO BACANAYA, petitioners, vs. JUDGE PATRICIO C. CENIZA of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental and ESTATE OF DECEASED GREGORIA SAQUIN represented by ATTY. VALERIANO KAAMINO, respondents.
FACTS

In September 1940, Cenona Capa initiated Special Proceeding No. 79 for the probate of the will of Sancho Capa. The will was admitted, and Gregoria Saquin, the widow, was appointed administratrix of the estate in October 1950. She was later removed and replaced by a special administrator. On November 21, 1951, Gregoria Saquin filed an application for support pendente lite. This was denied “for the present” by Judge Luis N. de Leon in an order dated December 20, 1951. The order noted that the property under administration appeared, based on the inventory, to belong exclusively to the deceased and not to be conjugal property, but it explicitly stated the court did not have the deed of partition to make a final determination.
Over three years later, on March 16, 1955, Judge Patricio Ceniza issued a new order directing the special administrator to turn over to Gregoria Saquin three-fourths of the cash proceeds from the estate’s harvests, representing her conjugal share and usufruct. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was taken from this 1955 order. However, on July 27, 1959, Cenona Capa filed a motion to annul the 1955 order, arguing it was issued without jurisdiction as it effectively set aside the allegedly final and executory 1951 order. Upon denial of this motion, petitioners instituted this special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the order of Judge Ceniza dated March 16, 1955, was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, having allegedly reversed a final and executory order from December 20, 1951.

RULING

The petition is without merit. The Supreme Court held that respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion or act without jurisdiction. The legal logic centers on the nature of the December 20, 1951, order. A careful examination reveals it was merely provisional and interlocutory, not a final adjudication. The order itself stated the court did not have the deed of partition before it and was thus in no position to conclusively determine whether the property under administration was conjugal or the exclusive share of the deceased. Its denial of support was explicitly made “for the present,” indicating its conditional and non-final character.
Being interlocutory, the 1951 order was not appealable and could never attain finality. Consequently, it remained subject to modification by the court as circumstances or evidence warranted. The subsequent order of March 16, 1955, which granted support based on a different factual assessment, did not constitute a reversal of a final judgment but a legitimate exercise of the court’s continuing jurisdiction over the provisional incidents of the estate proceedings. Since the earlier order was not final, the court retained the power to issue the 1955 directive. The petition for certiorari was therefore dismissed, and the writ denied.