GR L 16631; (September, 1965) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16631 September 20, 1965
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANUEL S. OZARRAGA, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of LEON CUÑAT, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
The plaintiff-appellant, Development Bank of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision dated July 20, 1965. That decision affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the Bank’s complaint against the estate of Leon Cuñat on the ground of prescription. The Bank argued two main grounds in its motion. First, it contended that the prescriptive period should be twenty years, not ten. Second, it argued that the debt moratorium period (Executive Order No. 32), which suspended the running of the prescriptive period, lasted until May 18, 1953 (the date of the Rutter vs. Esteban decision), not just until July 26, 1948 (the date Republic Act No. 342 was enacted). The Bank cited previous Supreme Court rulings (Rio y Cia. vs. Datu Jolkipli and Rio y Cia. vs. Court of Appeals) to support its second argument, stating that the burden of proof was on the defendant-appellee to show that the deceased Cuñat was not a war damage claimant to make the shorter moratorium period applicable.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider its decision affirming the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription, based on the appellant’s arguments regarding the applicable prescriptive period and the duration of the debt moratorium.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration. On the first ground, it ruled that the applicable law was the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), specifically Sections 40 and 43, not the Civil Code, because the prescriptive period began to run before the effectivity of the Civil Code. Therefore, the ten-year period was correct. On the second ground, the Court found that the appellant was estopped from claiming the benefit of the longer moratorium period. The record showed that both parties had previously taken it for granted that the moratorium for Cuñat’s obligation lasted only until July 26, 1948. This was evident from the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the Bank’s own opposition and memorandum in the trial court, as well as in its brief on appeal. The Bank’s previous pleadings impliedly admitted that Cuñat was not a war damage claimant. Consequently, the Bank could not later assert the absence of evidence on this point to invoke the longer moratorium period.