GR L 16595; (February, 1962) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16595. February 28, 1962.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PRIMITIVO PINCA @ TIBOY, ET AL., defendants, PRIMITIVO PINCA @ TIBOY and PASCUALITO ADORA @ LITOY, defendants-appellants.
FACTS
The appellants, along with others, were charged with Robbery in Band with Multiple Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. They voluntarily pleaded guilty to an amended information detailing the crime. On October 18, 1958, in Gamay, Samar, the armed accused conspired to forcibly enter the house of Ambrosio Montallana through a kitchen hole not meant for entry. While the occupants were asleep, the accused simultaneously attacked them with carbines, a pistol, a rifle, and bolos, killing Ambrosio Montallana, Donato Arceno, and Gregorio Ortiz, and seriously wounding the child Teodoro Montallana. They then tied Virginia Tan de Montallana, threatened her, and stole cash and valuables worth P5,297.00. After pleading guilty, the defense presented evidence to prove mitigating circumstances like lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
ISSUE
The core issue for automatic review is whether the trial court correctly imposed the death penalty on appellants Primitivo Pinca and Pascualito Adora by finding that three aggravating circumstances were only offset by one mitigating circumstance.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty. The legal logic centered on the proper appreciation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The trial court correctly identified three qualifying aggravating circumstances: (1) dwelling, as the accused forcibly entered the home through an opening not intended for entrance; (2) treachery, as the victims were attacked while asleep or lying down, unable to defend themselves, a fact substantiated by the positions of the wounds and bullet holes; and (3) the aid of armed men, as the appellants were armed with deadly weapons like carbines and a bolo during the commission of the crime. The Court clarified that other alleged aggravating circumstances like nighttime and abuse of superior strength were absorbed by treachery and thus not separately considered. Against these three aggravating circumstances, the Court recognized only one mitigating circumstance—the voluntary plea of guilty. Consequently, with three aggravations offset by only one mitigation, the imposition of the supreme penalty under the Revised Penal Code was legally justified. The Court found the crime exhibited extreme criminal perversity warranting the death penalty in the name of retributive justice.
