G.R. No. L-16520; April 30, 1964
JUAN CABUNGCAL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Juan Cabungcal and his spouse were defendants in an ejectment case filed by respondent Daisy Gustilo. After losing in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, they appealed to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for a trial de novo. The CFI also rendered a judgment against them on October 27, 1959. Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration on November 23, 1959, they filed a notice of appeal on November 27, and subsequently submitted their appeal bond and record on appeal on December 7. Respondent Gustilo moved to dismiss the appeal on December 8, arguing the judgment had become executory, but the respondent Judge denied this motion and approved the appeal bond and record on appeal in an order dated December 22, 1959.
Before the record could be transmitted to the Supreme Court, respondent Gustilo filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the approval order, alleging the record on appeal contained numerous specified errors. In response, the respondent Judge issued an order on December 29, 1959, setting aside his December 22 order of approval “until the defendant has met the opposition.” Petitioners then filed this original action for certiorari and mandamus, seeking to annul the December 29 order.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge lost jurisdiction to issue the December 29, 1959 order setting aside his prior approval of the record on appeal, upon the perfection of petitioners’ appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling the respondent Judge retained jurisdiction to issue the contested order. The Court clarified the established doctrine that a trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment upon the perfection of an appeal, preventing it from vacating said judgment. However, this doctrine was deemed inapplicable because the December 29 order did not vacate the judgment or affect the substantive issues on appeal. The controlling legal provisions were Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which explicitly allow a trial court, after the perfection of an appeal but before the transmittal of the record to the appellate court, to dismiss the appeal on specific grounds.
The Court reasoned that if the trial court retains the power to dismiss the appeal entirely during this interim period, it necessarily follows, a fortiori, that it possesses the lesser power to reconsider its order approving the record on appeal and bond. This reconsideration power is instrumental in allowing the court to inquire into the completeness and accuracy of the record on appeal, as alleged by the opposing party. The Court concluded that giving appellants an opportunity to address allegations of errors in the record was a less serious action than an outright dismissal of the appeal, and was within the court’s residual jurisdiction during the period before the record is elevated.