G.R. No. L-16483; April 30, 1964
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE MARIA DE LA CRUZ, MARGARITA DE LA CRUZ, petitioner-appellee, vs. PLARIDEL SURETY & INSURANCE CO., oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

In the intestate proceedings for Maria de la Cruz, the administrator, Margarita de la Cruz, filed a motion on April 28, 1957, to compel the surety, Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., to pay the liability of the former administrator, Teodorico Adsuara, amounting to P2,413.00. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija denied this motion on April 29, 1957, stating it was “not the proper remedy.” The appellee did not appeal this denial. Instead, on November 28, 1957, she filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court granted on December 9, 1957, setting aside its earlier order and directing the surety to pay.
The surety opposed, arguing the April 29 order had become final and that liability must be determined in a separate action. On February 28, 1958, the court issued an order reconsidering its April 29 denial and resetting the hearing on the original motion. The surety appealed from this February 28 order, contending the court had lost jurisdiction to reconsider its prior final order.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court’s order of February 28, 1958, which reconsidered its prior order of April 29, 1957, was issued without jurisdiction because the April 29 order had already become final and executory.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant surety and set aside the appealed order. The Court held that the order of April 29, 1957, which denied the administrator’s motion to enforce the surety’s liability, was a final order, not a merely interlocutory one. The test for finality is whether the order terminates the particular matter it addresses, putting an end to the litigation on that point, or leaves something more to be done on the merits. Here, the April 29 order was a final disposition of the specific motion to compel payment from the surety; it conclusively denied that remedy. Consequently, the proper recourse for the appellee was to appeal that order within the reglementary period.
By failing to appeal and instead filing a motion for reconsideration seven months later, the appellee allowed the April 29 order to become final and executory. The lower court thus lost jurisdiction to alter or reopen that final disposition. The Court further noted that the April 29 order was manifestly erroneous on the merits, as settled jurisprudence holds that a surety’s liability on an administrator’s bond is enforceable in the same probate proceeding after a hearing. However, this error did not prevent the order from attaining finality when not timely appealed. Therefore, the lower court committed reversible error in issuing the February 28, 1958, order.