GR L 16456; (June, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16456; June 29, 1963
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DOLORES COQUIA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On July 1, 1957, David C. Naval filed a complaint for grave oral defamation against Dolores Coquia in the Municipal Court of Naga City, leading to her arrest. The accused later renounced her right to the second stage of preliminary investigation, prompting the municipal court to forward the case records to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Sur on July 22, 1957. The CFI, in turn, endorsed the case to the City Attorney’s office for reinvestigation on August 2, 1957.
The City Fiscal’s office took no action on the case for an extended period. It was only on January 26, 1959, over one year and six months after the alleged offense, that the City Fiscal finally filed the corresponding information for grave oral defamation with the CFI. The defense moved to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription, which the trial court granted. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal by the government.
ISSUE
Did the filing of the complaint in the municipal court interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for the crime of grave oral defamation, thereby preventing the offense from being time-barred?
RULING
No, the prescriptive period was never interrupted, and the crime had prescribed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order of dismissal. The legal logic hinges on the proper interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which governs the interruption of prescription. The Court, citing its precedent in People v. Del Rosario, held that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 that interrupts the running of the prescriptive period is specifically the formal complaint or information filed in the proper court—not a mere denuncia or accusation lodged with a fiscal’s office.
In this case, the proper court for the offense was the Court of First Instance. The initial complaint filed in the municipal court and the subsequent endorsement to the fiscal’s office did not constitute the filing contemplated by law to interrupt prescription. The only act that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information in the CFI. Since this was done only on January 26, 1959, well beyond the six-month prescriptive period for grave oral defamation under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime had already prescribed. The Court emphasized that, as the prescriptive period was never legally interrupted, there was no need to resolve the subsidiary issue of when an “unjustifiably stopped” proceeding causes the period to resume running. The appeal was dismissed.