G.R. No. L-16216 December 28, 1963
PASTOR B. CONSTANTINO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BLAS AQUINO and EUFEMIA POLICARPIO, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Plaintiff Pastor Constantino filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage against defendants Blas Aquino and Eufemia Policarpio to recover unpaid loans secured by real estate. After defendants failed to appear at trial, the court rendered a judgment on September 25, 1957, ordering defendants to pay the principal sums with interest and attorney’s fees. This judgment did not contain an order directing defendants to pay the debt within a specific 90-day period from service, as required for foreclosure judgments under the Rules of Court. Plaintiff obtained a writ of execution, and the mortgaged property was sold at public auction on February 11, 1958, with plaintiff as the highest bidder. The sale was confirmed by the court on March 31, 1958.
Defendants subsequently filed motions for reconsideration, arguing the judgment and foreclosure sale were void because the court failed to issue the mandatory 90-day order for payment. The trial court, in an order dated June 24, 1958, agreed with defendants, suspended the effects of its prior orders confirming the sale, and essentially provided defendants a 90-day period from that new order to pay the judgment debt. Defendants then consigned the full amount due with the court on July 10, 1958.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court’s original judgment, which omitted the directive for the mortgagors to pay the debt within 90 days from service of order, and the subsequent foreclosure sale based thereon, are valid.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s orders, ruling the foreclosure sale was invalid due to the absence of the mandatory 90-day order in the judgment. The legal logic is grounded in procedural rules designed to protect the mortgagor’s equity of redemption. Section 2 of Rule 70 (now Section 2, Rule 68) of the Rules of Court explicitly requires that a judgment for foreclosure must order the mortgagor to pay the amount due within a period of not less than ninety days from the date of service of such order. This 90-day period is a substantive and jurisdictional requirement; it cannot be omitted, and the right to redeem exists within this fixed term. The period is counted from the service of the specific order containing this directive, not from the date of the general judgment or from any subsequent writ of execution.
The Court rejected appellant’s argument that the requirement was substantially complied with because more than 90 days had elapsed between the service of the general judgment and the issuance of the writ of execution. Compliance is not measured by the passage of time alone but by the court’s issuance and service of the precise order granting the redemption period. Since no such order was ever issued or served, the 90-day period never commenced to run. Consequently, the issuance of the writ of execution and the foreclosure sale conducted prior to the expiration of a lawful redemption period were premature and void. The subsequent consignation of payment by the defendants within the 90-day period properly set by the court’s June 24, 1958 order effectively exercised their right of redemption, rendering the foreclosure moot and restoring the mortgaged property to them upon full payment.