G.R. No. L-16187. February 27, 1963. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE MINORS BENIGNO, ANGELA & ANTONIO, all surnamed PEREZ Y TUASON, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, judicial guardian, J. ANTONIO ARANETA, trustee-appellee, vs. ANTONIO PEREZ, judicial guardian-appellant.
FACTS:

This appeal stems from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying a petition to modify its earlier order dated December 5, 1955. That 1955 order, based on a compromise agreement between the trustee (J. Antonio Araneta) and the judicial guardian of the minors, fixed the trustee’s fees by adopting the rates approved in a related case and specifically allowed the trustee to collect P15,000 as attorney’s fees for a certiorari incident. The guardian subsequently filed a petition for relief from this order under Rule 38, seeking to reduce the trustee’s future fees to rates charged by trust companies (around 5% of gross income) and to disallow attorney’s fees, also alleging an overpayment to the trustee from a related estate. This petition for relief was denied by the lower court on October 19, 1956, and the Supreme Court affirmed this denial in G.R. No. L-11788 on May 16, 1958.
While that appeal was pending, the guardian filed a motion on November 23, 1956, in the lower court seeking modification of the same December 5, 1955 order. He argued the settlor authorized only “honorarios razonables” (reasonable fees), which should match trust company rates, that the trustee, being a lawyer, should not collect separate attorney’s fees, and that any alleged overpayment as executor should be credited to the trust. This motion remained unacted upon. After the Supreme Court’s 1958 affirmation, the guardian pressed for a resolution of his 1956 motion. The lower court, on October 28, 1958, denied it, ruling the matters were already covered by the final December 5, 1955 order. The guardian appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in denying the guardian’s motion to modify the December 5, 1955 order regarding the trustee’s fees and entitlement to attorney’s fees.

RULING

No, the lower court correctly denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial. The appeal is untenable. First, the trustee’s fees, as set in the compromise agreement and approved in the December 5, 1955 order, were virtually confirmed by the Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in G.R. No. L-11788 and are thus final and may no longer be disturbed. Any claim of overpayment is a subtle attempt to undermine this final order and is barred.
Second, regarding the request to limit future trustee fees to trust company rates, the petition was premature. The reasonableness of trustee fees cannot be adjudicated in advance as it depends on variable circumstances like the character of the trust, risk, responsibility, time, and skill required in its administration. The court cannot preemptively cap fees based on trust company rates without proof of equal circumstances, especially given the distinction between dedicated corporate trustees and occasional individual trustees.
Third, the claim that the trustee should not collect separate attorney’s fees is foreclosed by the specific terms of the compromise embodied in the December 5, 1955 order, which this Court has affirmed. The parties are bound by this final order not only as to points actually adjudicated but also as to any issue that could have been raised prior to its finality. The order appealed from is affirmed.