GR L 16112; (June, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16112; June 29, 1963
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JESUS Y. PEREZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and STA. CRUZ TIMBER COMPANY, respondents.
FACTS
The Republic filed a complaint for the forfeiture of a forestry bond against Sta. Cruz Timber Company and its surety. The complaint alleged that the Timber Company could be served summons through its president, Alfonso L. Felix, Jr., at a specified Quezon City address. Accordingly, the sheriff served the summons by leaving copies with a certain Montano Renato at that address. The Timber Company failed to answer, leading the trial court to declare it in default. Subsequently, Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr., filed a motion to lift the order of default, asserting under oath that he was not the company’s president at the time of service, having ceased to hold that position in April 1949, and that he never resided at the stated address. He further averred that Montano Renato was not an employee or agent of the corporation. The respondent judge granted the motion and lifted the order of default. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, prompting the Republic to file the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the orders lifting the default and to compel the judge to reinstate it.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in lifting the order of default against Sta. Cruz Timber Company.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic centers on the validity of service of summons, which is jurisdictional. For a domestic corporation, valid service under the Rules of Court must be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any director. The record established that Alfonso Felix, Jr., was not the president of the Timber Company at the time of the alleged service in March 1958, a fact known to the Republic, which had been dealing with another attorney for the company prior to the suit. Furthermore, the person who allegedly received the summons, Montano Renato, held no position within the corporation. Consequently, there was no valid service of summons, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Timber Company. Lifting the default order to allow the company to answer was therefore proper to afford it its day in court. Even assuming the order was irregular, such an error of law is not correctible by certiorari but by appeal, as not every error constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The petition was denied for lack of merit.
