G.R. No. L-15976; January 31, 1962
APOLONIO DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BENJAMIN V. LIMBAGA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Apolonio de los Santos applied with Basilan City Engineer Benjamin V. Limbaga for a permit to construct a residential house on his land in Lamitan. The city engineer refused to grant the permit. De los Santos filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance to compel the issuance of the permit and claimed damages from the refusal.
The respondent city engineer, represented by the City Fiscal, opposed the petition. He asserted that the lot was included within an area designated for the expansion of the city market following a fire. Consequently, the City Council had approved a resolution to purchase additional land, and expropriation proceedings covering the petitioner’s lot had already been instituted in court. The respondent also moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the issuance of a permit was a discretionary act and that mandamus was improper. He further alleged that during the pendency of the case, de los Santos, under another person’s name, had secured a permit for and constructed a temporary movable store on the same site, thereby abandoning his original application.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the city engineer to issue the construction permit.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition for mandamus. The Court held that mandamus did not lie for two principal reasons. First, the land in question was already the subject of pending expropriation proceedings instituted by Basilan City. A writ of mandamus, which commands the performance of a ministerial duty, cannot be granted when its effect would be to compel an official act that is inconsistent with another ongoing judicial process, such as expropriation.
Second, and more fundamentally, the petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before resorting to court action. Under Commonwealth Act No. 424, the Director of Public Works exercises supervision and control over city engineers of chartered cities. The aggrieved party should have first appealed the city engineer’s decision to the Director of Public Works and, if still unsatisfied, to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The Court cited the established principle that a party must seek review from higher administrative authorities before invoking judicial intervention. This doctrine presumes that the administrative agency, given a full opportunity, will correct any error. Since de los Santos bypassed this hierarchical review process, his direct court action was premature. The order of dismissal was therefore correct.