G.R. No. L-15952. April 28, 1961.
SYBIL SAMSON, represented by his mother Consuelo Enriquez-Samson and CONSUELO ENRIQUEZ-SAMSON, petitioners, vs. HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, ARSENIO SAMSON and DOROTEA ANGELES VDA. DE SAMSON, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Sybil Samson, a minor, and his mother Consuelo Enriquez-Samson filed a petition for support against respondent Arsenio Samson (Sybil’s father and Consuelo’s husband) and Dorotea Angeles Vda. de Samson (Sybil’s grandmother). The petition alleged that Arsenio, a professor, had refused to provide support since February 1954 after Consuelo and Sybil left the conjugal home due to maltreatment by Dorotea, and that Arsenio had taken a concubine. The court granted support pendente lite of P120 monthly. At the scheduled hearing on February 3, 1958, petitioners failed to appear. Their counsel presented a medical certificate from Dr. Celso de los Angeles stating Sybil was seriously ill. The court, skeptical, directed the Municipal Health Officer of Marikina to examine Sybil. The Health Officer reported the child had only a slight fever and was ambulatory. Finding a discrepancy and noting Consuelo’s absence from home despite her claim of nursing her son, the court dismissed the petition with prejudice for failure to prosecute.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition for support with prejudice.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, annulling the dismissal orders. The legal logic is that dismissal with prejudice is an excessively harsh sanction not warranted by the circumstances. The petitioners’ absence was supported by a physician’s sworn certificate of serious illness. The subsequent finding of a “slight fever” by the Health Officer days later did not contradict the earlier diagnosis; it likely indicated the treatment was effective. The respondent court erred in presuming the child’s condition was identical on both dates. More critically, the minor petitioner’s presence at the hearing was not indispensable, as other witnesses and counsel were ready to proceed on the sole remaining issue—the amount of support—given that the marriage and the child’s legitimacy were admitted. Dismissing the case with prejudice constituted a gross denial of justice, as it would permanently extinguish the petitioners’ essential right to support, which by law (Article 301 of the Civil Code) is unrenounceable. This right had already been provisionally recognized by the court’s own order for support pendente lite. The court’s action, based on a flimsy ground and without considering lesser sanctions, was a capricious and arbitrary exercise of power amounting to grave abuse of discretion.