GR L 15950; (April, 1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-15950. April 20, 1961. GERVACIO DAUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. FELIPE ELEOSIDA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
FACTS
Gervacio Dauz, a general merchant in Kidapawan, Cotabato, was criminally prosecuted before the local justice of the peace court for willfully failing to pay the second, third, and fourth quarter license fees for the year 1958 as required by Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of 1956. The ordinance prescribed a penalty of a fine not exceeding P200.00, imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both.
Upon being summoned, Dauz filed a motion to quash the complaint, arguing that the alleged facts did not constitute a criminal offense. His contention was that, having already paid the first quarter’s fee for 1958, the government’s sole remedy for collecting the subsequent delinquent quarterly fees and statutory surcharges was to institute a civil action for collection, not a criminal prosecution. The justice of the peace denied his motion to quash.
ISSUE
Whether the court of first instance correctly dismissed Dauz’s petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the denial of his motion to quash in the justice of the peace court.
RULING
Yes, the dismissal was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of first instance. The complaint before the justice of the peace court plainly alleged a violation of a municipal ordinance prescribing a penalty within the court’s original jurisdiction under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 296 (The Judiciary Act of 1948). The legal sufficiency of the complaint was thus apparent on its face.
The Court ruled that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition were improper remedies at that stage. Dauz’s defense—that payment of the first quarter fee precluded criminal liability for subsequent quarters—involved a question of fact and law that pertained to the merits of the case. This defense should be properly raised, proven, and adjudicated during a full trial on the merits in the justice of the peace court. An adequate and speedy remedy was available to Dauz: if convicted after trial, he could appeal the decision to the court of first instance for a complete review. The established doctrine is that where the remedy of appeal is available and adequate, the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition will not lie. The lower court therefore correctly dismissed the petition. Costs were imposed on the appellant.