GR L 15844; (October, 1919) (Digest)

G.R. No. L-15844; October 3, 1919
JOSE F. TONGSON, petitioner, vs. C. M. VILLAREAL, judge, and ALEJANDRO ITCHON, respondents.

FACTS:
On June 3, 1919, an election was held for municipal officers in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Jose F. Tongson, Alejandro Itchon, Justo Kabayan, and Rosendo Farales were candidates for municipal president. The municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Tongson as the elected president. On June 28, 1919, Itchon (a defeated candidate) and others filed an election protest in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Tongson moved to dismiss the protest on two grounds: (1) that he was not served notice of the protest within the time prescribed by law, and (2) that not all candidates voted for were notified, specifically Rosendo Farales, a candidate for president. The respondent judge, after hearing evidence, found that while Farales was not notified, Farales appeared in open court and under oath renounced his interest in the protest, stating he did not wish to intervene. The judge thus dismissed the protest concerning councilmen (for lack of notice to all candidates) but denied the motion to dismiss regarding the protest for the presidency. Tongson then filed this original action for prohibition with the Supreme Court to prevent the lower court from proceeding with the protest.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of First Instance retains jurisdiction to hear a municipal election protest for the office of president when one candidate voted for (Rosendo Farales) was not notified of the protest but subsequently appeared in court and renounced his right to notice and any interest in the protest.

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for prohibition. On the first ground (untimely notice to Tongson), the Court held that the lower court’s factual finding on timely service is conclusive and cannot be collaterally attacked in a prohibition proceeding absent abuse of authority. On the second ground, the Court ruled that the requirement under the law that all candidates voted for must be notified aims to ensure every interested person is given an opportunity to be heard. However, this right to notice may be renounced. Since Farales voluntarily appeared in open court and expressly renounced his right to notice and any interest in the protest, the purpose of the law was satisfied. Consequently, the lower court did not lose jurisdiction over the protest. The failure to notify Farales under these circumstances did not oust the court of jurisdiction. The petition was denied without costs.