G.R. No. L-15813, December 29, 1960
German de Ortube, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Justiniano T. Asuncion and Jacobo R. Asuncion, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

German de Ortube filed a complaint in October 1957 to recover a debt of P4,700.00 from the defendants, evidenced by a promissory note payable on or before November 7, 1956, with interest. The defendants, in their answer, admitted the due execution of the note but asserted they had made payments, the amounts of which they needed to ascertain from their records. The hearing was set for June 6, 1958. On June 5, 1958, defendant Justiniano Asuncion sent telegrams to the court and the opposing attorney requesting postponement on the ground of his counsel’s illness, promising to submit a medical certificate later. Neither the defendants nor their counsel appeared at the hearing on June 6, 1958. The court rendered a decision on the same day, finding the promissory note authentic and ordering payment. On June 12, 1958, the defendants submitted the promised medical certificate. On July 8, 1958, they moved to set aside the decision, reiterating their counsel’s illness and asserting a “good defense,” supported by an affidavit stating they had made payments on the interest and principal but without specifying the amounts or dates. The trial court denied the motion.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying the defendants’ motion for postponement and their subsequent motion to set aside the decision.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The matter of granting relief from a party’s failure to appear at trial is largely discretionary with the judge and should not be interfered with unless abuse is patent. The Court noted several factors: (1) the motion for postponement was not under oath nor initially supported by a medical certificate; (2) it was signed by only one defendant; (3) no defendant appeared on the hearing date to ratify the telegram under oath; (4) according to the plaintiff, this was the second postponement requested by defendants on the ground of illness; and (5) most importantly, the affidavit of merit supporting the motion for new trial failed to specify the amounts and dates of the alleged payments, despite the defendants having over six months since their answer to ascertain these from their records. Considering the admitted genuineness of the promissory note and the existence of the debt, the defendants’ maneuvers appeared to be mere delay tactics.