GR L 1578; (September, 1947) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-1578; September 30, 1947
Peregrina Rebong, petitioner, vs. Fidel Ibañez, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Peregrina Rebong filed a petition for certiorari against respondent Judge Fidel Ibañez of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. The petitioner challenged the judge’s denial of her petition to cancel a lien or annotation on her certificate of title. The annotation stated that the property, which she extrajudicially inherited as the sole heir of her predecessors Jose Rebong and Maria Rebong, was subject to the claims of the deceased’s creditors and other heirs for a period of two years from July 9, 1947, pursuant to Sections 1 and 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner based her request for cancellation on Section 112 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act) and offered to file a bond worth P5,000 (the estimated property value) to answer for any contingent claims.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for cancellation of the annotated lien on the certificate of title.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. The Court held that the respondent judge did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion but in conformity with the law. Applying Section 112 of Act No. 496, the Court found that the court’s power to order the cancellation of a memorandum on a certificate is contingent upon the registered interest having “terminated and ceased.” In this case, the annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs, established by Rule 74, Section 4, had not yet terminated or ceased because the two-year period from July 9, 1947, had not elapsed. Neither Section 4 of Rule 74 nor Section 112 of Act No. 496 authorizes the substitution of a bond for a registered contingent interest that has not yet expired. Therefore, the respondent judge correctly denied the petition for cancellation.
Separate Opinion:
Justice Perfecto concurred, noting that the petition was effectively for mandamus, seeking to compel the lower court to exercise its discretion to allow the bond and cancel the lien. He found no legal duty for the lower court to do so. He also found the petitioner’s reasons unconvincing, particularly her claim that she needed the cancellation to mortgage the property, as she could potentially obtain a loan with the same sureties she proposed for the bond.