G.R. No. L-15717. June 30, 1961.
JULIAN BOÑAGA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ROBERTO SOLER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Following the deaths of spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac, intestate proceedings commenced. Administrator Juan Garza was authorized by the probate court in August 1944 to sell estate properties. He sold numerous parcels, comprising almost the entire estate, to Roberto Soler for a lump sum. This sale was later approved by the court. Subsequently, the heirs of Maria Isaac sold their interests in specific parcels to Soler. The estate’s records were destroyed during the war and later reconstituted, with Julian Boñaga appointed as the new administrator in 1951.
In 1952, Boñaga, as administrator, filed an action to annul the 1944 sales to Soler. The complaint alleged the sales were fraudulent, conducted without notice to the heirs of Alejandro Ros, and not beneficial to the estate. It sought reconveyance and damages. Soler filed multiple motions to dismiss. The trial court, in 1959, ultimately dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Boñaga was estopped from challenging the sales and that the action had prescribed. Boñaga appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Did the trial court err in dismissing the complaint on the grounds of estoppel and prescription without a full trial on the merits?

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal order and remanded the case for trial. The legal logic is as follows: First, regarding the validity of the probate sale, sales under Rule 90, Sections 4 and 7, require mandatory compliance with procedural requisites, including notice to all heirs. The record failed to show that notice was given to the heirs of Alejandro Ros, a fatal defect that could render the sale void ab initio. The trial court could not conclusively determine the applicable rule (e.g., whether it was a sale for debts under Section 2, which has different notice requirements) or compliance therewith without receiving evidence. Dismissal at the pleading stage was therefore premature.
Second, the defense of estoppel was improperly sustained. The established principle is that an administrator is not estopped from questioning the validity of his own void deed purporting to convey estate property. A successor administrator, like Boñaga, stands in the same position and has the duty to recover estate assets wrongfully disposed of.
Third, the defense of prescription was both waived and factually unproven at the pleading stage. Prescription was not raised in Soler’s first two motions to dismiss or in his answer; it was invoked only in a third motion filed over three years after the complaint. Under the Rules of Court, this constituted a waiver. Furthermore, the action, characterized as one for reconveyance based on an implied trust, prescribes from the discovery of the fraud. The time of such discovery is a question of fact not apparent from the face of the pleadings, necessitating a trial. The order of dismissal was thus erroneous and improvident.