G.R. No. L-15606. June 29, 1963. IMAN SAHIM (MORO), petitioner, vs. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Basilan City and DOMINGO ALVAREZ, respondents.
FACTS

The case originated from a complaint for recovery of possession filed by respondent Domingo Alvarez against petitioner Iman Sahim over a parcel of land in Basilan City. The land was part of the public domain and the subject of conflicting homestead applications. The administrative conflict was resolved through a series of decisions by the Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and finally the Office of the President, all consistently dismissing Sahim’s application and awarding the land to Alvarez. Despite these final administrative rulings in his favor, Alvarez had been unable to gain possession, as the civil case for recovery, filed as early as 1950, remained pending. After Alvarez finished presenting his evidence in the civil case in 1959, the respondent judge granted his renewed petition for a preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering Sahim to vacate the property upon the posting of a bond.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing a preliminary mandatory injunction to place Alvarez in possession of the disputed land during the pendency of the civil action for recovery.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court acknowledged the general rule that a preliminary mandatory injunction should not be granted to transfer possession from one party to another whose title has not been clearly established, as possession is presumed lawful. However, this rule is not absolute. The Court recognized exceptions for compelling reasons where the court may properly exercise its discretion.
In this case, such compelling reasons existed. The land was public domain, and the exclusive right to possess it, pending the issuance of a final patent, had been definitively adjudicated in favor of Alvarez through a complete administrative process that culminated in a decision by the Office of the President. These final administrative decisions, which were part of the evidence before the trial court, established a strong prima facie right in favor of Alvarez. Given that these executive acts under the Public Land Act, rendered with due process, are generally not subject to judicial review, and considering the prolonged inability of Alvarez to possess the land awarded to him despite final administrative rulings, the trial court’s discretionary grant of the injunction to prevent further delay and injustice was justified. The issuance was not a patent and capricious exercise of power but a sound judicial response to the unique circumstances.