G.R. No. L-15364; May 31, 1961
VIRGINIA CLAREZA, ET AL., plaintiffs. FELIPE J. ZAMORA, plaintiff-intervenor-appellant, vs. BENJAMIN A. ROSALES and AMADO A. DIMAYUGA, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

The original plaintiffs, Virginia Clareza and her children, filed a damages suit against defendants Benjamin Rosales and Amado Dimayuga for the death of Juan Luno, Clareza’s husband, arising from a vehicular collision. The defendants answered, attributing negligence to the deceased and filing a counterclaim for their own damages. Subsequently, Felipe J. Zamora, the owner of the taxicab driven by Luno, moved to intervene. He alleged having paid P4,000 in compensation to Luno’s heirs under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and claimed subrogation to their rights against the defendants. His attached complaint sought recovery of various damages, including the amount he paid.
The lower court initially admitted the complaint in intervention. However, the defendants moved to dismiss both the original complaint and the intervention. They argued that the plaintiffs, having received compensation from Zamora, no longer possessed a cause of action against the defendants, thereby extinguishing the basis for any intervention. The trial court agreed and dismissed both the main complaint and the complaint in intervention, prompting Zamora’s appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court correctly dismissed the complaint in intervention filed by Felipe J. Zamora.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal order and allowed Zamora to be substituted as the proper party plaintiff. The Court clarified the nature of intervention as ancillary to an existing litigation; it presupposes an active claim by the original party that the intervenor seeks to aid. Strictly speaking, the original plaintiffs’ right of action against the defendants ceased upon Zamora’s payment of compensation, as they were thereby made whole under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Consequently, with no remaining right for the original plaintiffs to assert, a traditional intervention to aid them lost its foundation.
However, the Court held that Zamora’s proper procedural recourse was not intervention but substitution. Section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No. 3812, as amended) expressly provides that an employer who pays compensation “shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovery” from the third-party wrongdoer. This statutory subrogation effected a transfer of the actionable right from the heirs to Zamora. Under Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, in case of any transfer of interest, the court may direct the transferee to be substituted for the original party. Zamora’s motion, although labeled as one for intervention, essentially prayed for this substitution. Allowing substitution, rather than dismissing the case, aligns with the rules’ policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits and enabling the real party in interest to prosecute the claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings with Zamora substituted as plaintiff.