G.R. No. L-15346; June 29, 1962
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO FELISARTA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Rogelio Felisarta was apprehended for driving a rig without a driver’s license on the streets of Cebu City, in violation of City Ordinance No. 65. He was convicted in the Municipal Court and fined five pesos. On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the conviction but increased the fine to fifteen pesos. Felisarta then appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the validity of the ordinance’s licensing provision.
The appellant argued that the City Charter of Cebu ( Commonwealth Act No. 58 ) did not specifically list the occupation of rig driver among those subject to licensing under the Municipal Board’s powers. He contended that the license fee could not be justified under the general welfare clause, asserting the ordinance was an invalid exercise of municipal power.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the City of Cebu had the legal authority to enact Ordinance No. 65, requiring rig drivers to obtain a license and pay a nominal fee, and to penalize violations thereof.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and upheld the validity of the ordinance. The Court clarified that while the specific enumeration in the city charter’s licensing section might not explicitly include rig drivers, the city’s authority to regulate them is firmly grounded in its general police power. The charter expressly authorizes the Municipal Board to enact ordinances for the “sanitation and safety, … good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.”
The Court established that the ordinance was a valid regulatory measure under the police power, not a revenue-generating tax. It explained that municipal licenses generally fall into three classes: for regulating useful occupations (police power), for regulating non-useful occupations (police power), and for revenue purposes (taxing power). The license fee for rig drivers, set at one peso per year, clearly fell into the first class. Its purpose was to defray the expenses of registration and necessary police surveillance over a public conveyance affecting city streets, safety, and order. The amount was deemed sufficient only to cover regulatory costs, not to raise revenue. Consequently, the city did not need an express grant of taxing power for this fee. The penalty imposed was in accordance with the ordinance. The Court distinguished this case from those involving the taxing power, which requires an explicit statutory grant.