G.R. No. L-15325; August 31, 1960
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JUDGE CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA, Court of First Instance of Rizal, and ALFONSO SAMOSA Y LIZARDO, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Alfonso Samosa y Lizardo was charged with raping his daughter, Erlinda Samosa y Mañalac, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan, Rizal. The case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7954, and presided over by respondent Judge Cecilia Muñoz-Palma. On January 6, 1959, the court rendered a decision convicting Samosa of qualified seduction and imposing an indeterminate penalty. This decision was promulgated on January 13, 1959, and an order of commitment was issued. On January 14, 1959, the accused wrote a letter to the respondent Judge pleading for reconsideration, claiming the charge was groundless and an act of vengeance by his wife. The Clerk of Court informed the accused’s former counsel of this letter on January 23, 1959. The accused sent another letter on January 29, 1959, reiterating his plea and alleging he possessed a letter from the complainant exonerating him. On February 6, 1959, the court appointed Atty. Salvacion Birco as counsel de oficio for the accused. On February 9, 1959, Atty. Birco filed a motion for new trial based on the alleged recantation of the complainant, but withdrew it during the hearing when the complainant refused to appear, instead requesting a reduction of the penalty. By an order dated February 18, 1959, the respondent Judge amended the original decision by reducing the minimum penalty, eliminating the provision for support of offspring (as complainant was not pregnant), and crediting the accused with one-half of his preventive imprisonment. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for certiorari. The prosecution argues the February 18, 1959, order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction because the original decision had become final and executory on January 26, 1959 (15 days after its promulgation on January 13, 1959).

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated February 18, 1959, amending the original decision of January 6, 1959, on the ground that said original decision had already become final and executory.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the case. The Court held that the respondent Judge did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction. Pursuant to Rule 116, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or an appeal has been perfected. The Court found that the respondent Judge must have regarded the accused’s letter of January 14, 1959, as a petition for new trial. Under Rule 118, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the filing of a motion for new trial suspends the running of the period to appeal. The Clerk of Court’s communication of January 23, 1959, and the court’s order of February 6, 1959, appointing counsel de oficio, indicated that the court treated the letter as a cause to suspend the period for the decision to become final. Consequently, when the amended order was issued on February 18, 1959, the original decision was not yet final and executory. Therefore, the respondent Judge, having plenary power to amend her decision before it became final, acted within her jurisdiction in issuing the order of February 18, 1959.