G.R. No. L-15315; August 26, 1960
ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ, ETC. ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Abundio Merced filed a civil action (Civil Case No. R-5387) for the annulment of his second marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar. He alleged that he was forced, threatened, and intimidated into signing an affidavit and into contracting the marriage on August 21, 1957, and that he never lived with Ceasar thereafter. Elizabeth Ceasar filed an answer denying the allegations and counterclaimed for damages. Subsequently, on February 19, 1958, Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Merced. An information was filed (Criminal Case No. V-6520) charging Merced with bigamy for contracting the second marriage while his first marriage to Eufrocina Tan was still subsisting. Merced moved to suspend the criminal proceedings until the final termination of the civil annulment case, arguing that the civil action involved facts that, if proven, would determine his innocence. The Court of First Instance initially granted the motion but, upon the fiscal’s motion for reconsideration, set aside its order and denied the suspension. The court relied on People vs. Mendoza, holding that a judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not necessary for a bigamy prosecution and that the grounds for annulment should be raised as a defense in the criminal action. Merced’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for certiorari with prohibition.

ISSUE

Whether an action for the annulment of a second marriage constitutes a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order denying the suspension of the criminal case, and made the preliminary injunction permanent.
The Court defined a prejudicial question as one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It has two elements: (1) the question must be determinative of the case before the court, and (2) jurisdiction to try that question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Applying this to bigamy, it is an essential element of the crime that the second marriage would be valid were it not for the existence of the first marriage. One of the essential requisites for a valid marriage is the free and voluntary consent of the contracting parties. The petitioner’s civil action precisely puts in issue the validity of his consent to the second marriage, seeking its annulment on grounds of force and intimidation. The validity of this second marriage, therefore, cannot be determined in the criminal case for bigamy but must be resolved in the separate civil action for annulment. The resolution of the civil case is logically antecedent to the bigamy prosecution because if the second marriage is declared null and void due to vitiated consent, the crime of bigamy would not lie.
The Court distinguished the cited case of People vs. Mendoza. In Mendoza, the second marriage was void ab initio by operation of law (as it was bigamous when contracted), and thus no judicial declaration of nullity was needed to establish that it was not a valid marriage for the purpose of a subsequent bigamy charge. In contrast, in the present case, the alleged invalidity of the second marriage stems from a defect in consent (a vice of the will), which typically requires a judicial declaration of nullity in a civil action.
The Court further held that the principle of a prejudicial question applies even if both actions are pending in the same court (the Court of First Instance), as the court, when exercising its civil jurisdiction, is considered distinct from itself when exercising its criminal jurisdiction.
Consequently, the civil action for annulment presents a prejudicial question that must be decided first before the criminal action for bigamy can proceed.