G.R. No. L-15313. March 25, 1961.
Pisingan Chiong, petitioner-appellant, vs. Republic of the Philippines, oppositor-appellee.

FACTS

The Zamboanga Court of First Instance granted Pisingan Chiong’s petition for naturalization in its decision dated January 31, 1956. The City Attorney appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. On April 16, 1958, the Supreme Court rendered its own decision, affirming the lower court’s judgment and thereby finally approving the grant of naturalization.
Subsequently, on September 22, 1958, Chiong filed a motion in the lower court to be allowed to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen. The City Attorney opposed this motion, arguing that the mandatory two-year probationary period prescribed under Republic Act No. 530 had not yet been completed. The City Attorney contended that the two-year period should be counted from the date of the Supreme Court’s final decision in April 1958. In contrast, Chiong argued that the period should be reckoned from the date of the original lower court decision in January 1956.

ISSUE

The sole issue is from which date should the two-year probationary period under Republic Act No. 530 be computed: from the date of the trial court’s initial favorable decision, or from the date of the Supreme Court’s final affirmance on appeal?

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of Chiong’s motion, ruling that the two-year period must be counted from the date of the final decision of the Supreme Court. The legal logic is anchored on the nature and purpose of the probationary period under the naturalization law. Republic Act No. 530 requires a period of two years from the promulgation of a final decision granting citizenship, during which the applicant must demonstrate continued possession of all qualifications and the absence of any disqualifications. This period is a substantive condition precedent to the final act of admission—the taking of the oath.
A trial court’s decision granting naturalization is not final if appealed; it becomes final only upon affirmance by the appellate court. The probationary period is intended to observe the applicant’s conduct after all judicial scrutiny has been conclusively resolved in his favor. Counting the period from an interlocutory lower court decision that was still subject to appeal would be illogical, as the grant itself remained in jeopardy and under review. The Court cited its established doctrine in Republic v. Makalintal, which was impliedly followed in Uy v. Republic, holding uniformly that the two-year period commences from the date of the final judgment of the Supreme Court. Therefore, Chiong’s motion was premature, as the period from April 1958 to September 1958 was less than two years. The denial was correct.