G.R. No. L-15179; September 30, 1960
TEODORA AMAR, for herself and as administratix of the Estate of the late Juan Ocaso, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JESUS ODIAMAN, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On November 24, 1958, plaintiff-appellant Teodora Amar filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Capiz to recover a piece of land in barrio Majanlud, Sapian, Capiz. She alleged that the defendant-appellee Jesus Odiaman and others had seized the land in April 1948 through deceit, fraud, and strategem. She also sought damages for the yearly products of the land since 1948, plus attorney’s fees. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action, having accrued in April 1948, was already barred by the statute of limitations as the complaint was filed more than ten years later. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, applying the ten-year prescriptive period under Act No. 190 (the Code of Civil Procedure), which was the law in force when the cause of action arose. The court noted there was no allegation that the running of the prescriptive period had been interrupted.
After a motion for reconsideration was denied, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding allegations that she had previously filed two other cases involving the same land: (1) a forcible entry case (Civil Case No. V-484) filed on September 8, 1948, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Sapian, which was dismissed upon her own motion on July 17, 1951, while on appeal to the Court of First Instance; and (2) an action for ownership and damages (Civil Case No. V-755) filed on May 29, 1952, which was dismissed without prejudice on September 13, 1957. She argued that the filing of these cases constituted judicial demands that interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. The lower court treated the motion to amend as a second motion for reconsideration and denied it, reiterating that under Act No. 190 , the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the presentation of a judicial action. The plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of the previous cases (Civil Case No. V-484 and Civil Case No. V-755) interrupted the running of the ten-year prescriptive period for bringing an action to recover real property, thereby preventing the present action from being barred by the statute of limitations.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint. The prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the previous cases, and the present action was barred.
The cause of action accrued in April 1948 when the defendant allegedly deprived the plaintiff of possession. Since this occurred before the effectivity of the new Civil Code (August 30, 1950), the applicable law on prescription is Act No. 190 (the Code of Civil Procedure), pursuant to Article 1116 of the new Civil Code. Section 40 of Act No. 190 provides that an action for recovery of title to or possession of real property can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues.
The Court held that Act No. 190 contains no specific provision stating that the institution of a judicial action suspends or interrupts the running of the prescriptive period. Following established jurisprudence (Peralta vs. Alipio, 97 Phil. 719; Oriental Commercial Co., Inc. vs. Jureidini, Inc., 71 Phil. 25; Conspecto vs. Fruto, 31 Phil. 144), the filing of an action within the prescriptive period, if the plaintiff desists from its prosecution or the action is dismissed, does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations. The parties are left in the same position as if no action had been commenced.
Therefore, the filing of Civil Case No. V-484 (dismissed in 1951) and Civil Case No. V-755 (dismissed without prejudice in 1957) did not interrupt the running of the ten-year prescriptive period that began in April 1948. The present action was instituted in November 1958, which was more than ten years after the cause of action accrued (i.e., seven months after the prescriptive period expired in April 1958). Consequently, the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and the lower court correctly dismissed the complaint.