G.R. No. L-14925; April 30, 1960
MARTA VDA. DE LA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GENARO TAN TORRES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and ROSALINDA Z. TIONGCO, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Rosalinda Z. Tiongco filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Civil Case No. 3016) alleging she was the owner and in actual possession of Lot No. 1856, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, with improvements and a ready-to-harvest palay crop. She alleged that on October 19, 1958, petitioner Marta Vda. de la Cruz, with her children and armed men, entered the lot, destroyed plaintiff’s barbed wire fences and her tenant’s house, and threatened to return to harvest the palay by force. A further threat was made for October 22, 1958. Plaintiff prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent defendant from entering the land and molesting her possession, and for damages. The lower court, in its order of November 5, 1958, issued the writ of preliminary injunction. The order noted that during hearings, defendant’s counsel, through a written manifestation, agreed to the issuance of the writ provided she be allowed to file a counter-bond to preserve her possession and the palay. The court ordered the writ issued, stating that if the defendant wanted to lift it by filing a counter-bond, she should file the corresponding petition. Petitioner challenged the propriety of this order via certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.

RULING

No, the Court of First Instance did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
1. Injunction as a Provisional Remedy in an Action for Injunction: The petitioner’s contention that a preliminary injunction cannot stand alone is erroneous. While a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy ancillary to a principal action, it is properly issuable in an action where the main relief sought is a permanent injunction, as authorized under Section 3(a), Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. The complaint here sought a permanent injunction as final relief.
2. Sufficiency of Allegations: The allegations of ownership, peaceful possession, and threats and acts of dispossession and destruction by the defendant, causing irreparable injury, provided a sufficient basis for the lower court’s discretion to issue the preliminary writ. No abuse of discretion was found.
3. Service of Plaintiff’s Bond: The alleged lack of service of a copy of the plaintiff’s bond is a formal defect that does not invalidate the writ. Such a defect can be cured by subsequent notice or knowledge and may be considered waived when, as here, the defendant seeks to file a counter-bond.
4. Effect of Offer to File a Counter-Bond: The petitioner’s interpretation that her mere offer to file a counter-bond should suffice to quash the writ is incorrect. The lower court’s order required the filing of a proper petition. The issuance or dissolution of a preliminary injunction rests on valid grounds within the court’s sound discretion, not merely on the parties’ agreement or an offer of a counter-bond. A threatened destruction of property cannot be allowed simply because the threatening party offers to pay damages.
The Supreme Court noted that the petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals but decided it on its merits to expedite resolution.