G.R. No. L-14925; April 30, 1960
MARTA VDA. DE LA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GENARO TAN TORRES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and ROSALINDA Z. TIONGCO, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Rosalinda Z. Tiongco filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 3016) in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, alleging she is the owner and in actual possession of Lot No. 1856, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, with improvements and a palay crop ready for harvest. She claimed that on October 19, 1958, petitioner Marta Vda. de la Cruz, with her children and armed men, entered the lot, destroyed barbed wire fences and a tenant’s house, and threatened to return to harvest the palay by force and intimidation. Tiongco sought a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent further entry and molestation, along with damages and attorney’s fees. After hearings, the lower court issued the writ on November 5, 1958, based partly on a written manifestation from petitioner’s counsel agreeing to the writ provided a counterbond could be filed to preserve possession and the palay. The court ordered the writ issued but stated petitioner could later petition to lift it by filing a counterbond. Petitioner moved to dissolve the writ, which was denied, leading to this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in petitioner’s contentions.
1. Injunction as a Provisional Remedy: The Court held that a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy ancillary to a principal case and can properly be issued in an action where the main relief sought is injunction itself, as authorized under Rule 60, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Court.
2. Sufficiency of Allegations: The allegations of ownership, peaceful possession, and threatened acts of dispossession and destruction by the petitioner were deemed sufficient to warrant the writ, and no abuse of discretion by the lower court was found.
3. Service of Plaintiff’s Bond: The Court ruled that failure to serve a copy of the plaintiff’s bond was a formal defect that could be cured by subsequent notice or knowledge, and it could be considered waived when the defendant seeks to file a counterbond, as in this case.
4. Effect of Offering a Counterbond: The mere offer to file a counterbond is not sufficient to dissolve a writ of preliminary injunction. The lower court retains discretion to grant or dissolve the writ based on valid grounds, such as the insufficiency of the complaint or whether the continuance of the writ would cause great damage to the defendant compensable to the plaintiff. A threatened destruction of property cannot be countenanced simply because the offending party is willing to pay damages.
The Court noted that the petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals but decided it on its merits to save time. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.