G.R. No. L-14913. January 30, 1962.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY and ANDRES GARCIA, petitioners, vs. HON. ZOILO HILARIO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, PASTOR PANO, FORTUNATO PANO, MAXIMO PANO, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

The respondents, the Pano family, filed a damages suit in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the Manila Railroad Company and its train driver, Andres Garcia. The action arose from a collision between the company’s train and a truck, resulting in the death of Emilia de la Cruz. The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of improper venue. Their motion was based on the original complaint’s allegations that the plaintiffs were residents of Nueva Ecija, the Railroad Company’s main office was in Manila, and the co-defendant Garcia resided in Manila, thereby making Manila the proper venue under the rules.
However, before the court ruled on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs amended their complaint. The amended pleading specifically alleged that one of the plaintiffs, Fortunato Pano, was a resident of Paniqui, Tarlac. Based on this amended allegation, the respondent judge, Hon. Zoilo Hilario, denied the motion to dismiss. The petitioners then filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion and in assuming cognizance of the case.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss based on improper venue, considering the amended complaint’s allegation of a plaintiff’s residence in Tarlac.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The legal logic centers on the distinction between jurisdiction and venue, and the procedural stage at which the trial court made its ruling. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional. Under Rule 5, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an action may be commenced in the province where any of the plaintiffs resides. The amended complaint contained a positive allegation that Fortunato Pano resided in Paniqui, Tarlac. At the stage of a motion to dismiss, the trial court must take the material allegations of the complaint as hypothetically true. Therefore, with that allegation on record, the court in Tarlac could not be prohibited from taking cognizance of the case.
The Court held that the respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in accepting the plaintiffs’ residency allegation prima facie for the purpose of ruling on the motion. The petitioners’ submission of certificates from Paniqui officials, asserting that Fortunato Pano was not a resident there, constituted evidentiary matter. Such evidence should properly be presented during the trial on the merits when the defendants present their side, not at the preliminary motion stage. These certificates, while relevant, are not conclusive and do not automatically invalidate the complaint’s allegation for venue purposes. The trial court’s remarks, while noted, were deemed to have some bearing on the exercise of its discretion. Consequently, the petitioners failed to establish a clear right to the extraordinary writs of certiorari or prohibition.