G.R. No. L-14898. September 19, 1961. MARIA MACABENTA, petitioner-appellee, vs. EMMA H. VER-REYES, ET AL., respondents. EMMA H. VER-REYES, respondent-appellant.
FACTS

The spouses Emma H. Ver-Reyes and Ramon Reyes filed an unlawful detainer action in the Manila Municipal Court against Maximo Umali and Maria Macabenta to recover possession of a parcel of land. The defendants claimed a perpetual lease and an option to buy granted by the plaintiffs’ parents. The court found the lease was oral and month-to-month, that rents were in arrears, and that the plaintiffs needed the property to build their own house. The court rendered a decision ordering the defendants to pay specified amounts of back rentals, monthly rents until they “finally vacate the place,” plus attorney’s fees and costs. This decision became final and executory.
A writ of execution was subsequently issued, commanding the sheriff to cause the defendants to remove from the premises and to collect the adjudged amounts. To prevent this execution, Maria Macabenta filed a petition for prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging a material variance between the decision and the writ. The lower court agreed, finding a “clear variance,” and granted the writ of prohibition. Emma H. Ver-Reyes appealed this grant of prohibition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether there exists a material variance between the dispositive portion of the decision in the unlawful detainer case and the writ of execution issued to enforce it, such that the issuance of the writ constituted an act in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and dismissed the petition for prohibition. The Court held there was no material variance between the decision and the writ of execution. While the dispositive part of the Municipal Court’s decision did not contain an explicit, separate order for the defendants to vacate, such relief was clearly inferable from the text. The decision expressly ordered Macabenta to pay monthly rents “up to the time she finally vacates the place.” This language logically and necessarily presupposed and mandated the act of vacating the premises as a condition for terminating the liability for ongoing rents. The writ of execution, therefore, which commanded the defendants’ removal, did not alter the judgment but merely enforced its clear intent and implication. The issuance of the writ was a proper exercise of jurisdiction to give effect to the judgment in an ejectment case where restitution of possession is the primary relief. The subsequent act of the judge in issuing the writ confirmed this interpretation of the decision’s meaning.