G.R. No. L-1471, November 21, 1903
J.V. KNIGHT, petitioner, vs. J. McMICKING, clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondent.

FACTS:
On March 31, 1903, a judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner J.V. Knight by the justice of the peace of Manila. The defendant, B.O. Eide, appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila and filed the requisite appeal bond. The justice of the peace duly forwarded the record to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, the respondent J. McMicking. The respondent clerk refused to docket the appealed case because the docketing fees prescribed under Section 788 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not been paid. The petitioner filed this action for mandamus to compel the clerk to docket the case without requiring advance payment of the fees, arguing that the appeal bond already covered such costs and that the clerk’s duty to docket under Section 78 of the Code is mandatory.

ISSUE:
Whether the clerk of the Court of First Instance may lawfully require payment of docket fees in advance before docketing an appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace.

RULING:
No. The petition for mandamus is denied. The Supreme Court held that the clerk of the Court of First Instance is entitled to demand payment of his fees in advance before docketing an appealed case from a justice of the peace. The Court distinguished between “costs” (expenses incurred by a party) and “fees” (compensation paid to an officer for services). The appeal bond required under Section 76 of the Code is for the benefit of the opposing party and is conditioned only for the payment of “costs” that may be finally awarded, not for the advance payment of the clerk’s “fees.” Section 78, which states “the clerk shall docket the same,” is read in conjunction with the immediately following phrase entitling the clerk to the same fees as for services in suits originating in the court. Since the law generally entitles court officers to fees in advance (except in specific instances like habeas corpus proceedings), and mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when no other adequate remedy exists, the petitioner has an adequate remedy by simply paying the required fee to have the case docketed. The bond protects him for the ultimate recovery of costs.

DISSENTING OPINION (Cooper, J.):
Justice Cooper dissented, arguing that the clerk’s duty to docket under Section 78 is unconditional and mandatory. He emphasized that a perfected appeal vacates the judgment of the justice of the peace, and the appellant’s only duties are to file the notice of appeal and the bond. Thereafter, the duty to transmit and docket devolves upon the justice and the clerk, respectively. The omission from Section 788 (regarding Court of First Instance clerk’s fees) of an express provision allowing advance paymentunlike Section 787 governing the Supreme Court clerkimplies no such right was intended. Therefore, mandamus should issue to compel the clerk to perform his ministerial duty.