G.R. No. L-14541; March 30, 1960
CONSUELO VELAYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO VELAYO, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from a suit for support and partition of conjugal property filed by petitioner Consuelo Velayo against her husband, respondent Rodolfo Velayo, in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The trial court approved the parties’ agreement for separation of property in its decision dated May 30, 1953, ordering compliance with its terms. Upon petitioner’s motion, a writ of execution was issued for sums due as support and her share of conjugal properties. Due to unsatisfied execution, petitioner moved to examine respondent regarding his properties. An order to appear could not be served as respondent’s counsel withdrew and respondent failed to inform the court of his address. Petitioner later filed a petition to cite respondent for contempt. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, to which the case was transferred, issued an order on January 8, 1958, requiring respondent to pay all sums due under the 1953 decision within 30 days or be held in contempt. Respondent filed a notice of appeal and posted a bond. In the Court of Appeals, respondent moved to dismiss the case based on an amicable settlement he entered into with petitioner. The appellate court issued a resolution on August 9, 1958, dismissing the case. Petitioner now seeks review, arguing the compromise agreement is void for containing terms contrary to law, morals, and public policy.

ISSUE

Whether the compromise agreement is void in its entirety due to certain stipulations that are contrary to law, morals, and public policy, and whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the entire case based on this agreement.

RULING

No, the compromise agreement is not void in its entirety. The Court found that certain provisions of the agreement were indeed invalid and contrary to law and morals, specifically: (1) petitioner’s pardon and condonation of “all acts of concubinage” committed by respondent, and (2) her waiver of any claim for future support. The right to receive support cannot be renounced (Article 301, New Civil Code), and no compromise upon future support is valid (Article 2035, New Civil Code). However, these invalid stipulations are independent and separable from the rest of the agreement’s terms without violating the parties’ manifest intention. Therefore, under Article 1420 of the New Civil Code, the valid terms can be enforced. The Court found other stipulations proper, such as petitioner’s waiver of claims for support under the pending case, respondent’s custody of their children, and his undertaking to incorporate his business and give the children a one-third share. The Court also found respondent had partially performed the agreement by giving petitioner sums of money and executing a deed of assignment for the benefit of the children. Consequently, the Court of Appeals’ outright dismissal of the entire case was improper. The compromise agreement constituted a waiver only of petitioner’s claim for support under the case, not of her share in the conjugal properties. The order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, from which respondent appealed, obligated him to pay both support in arrears and petitioner’s share of conjugal properties under the 1953 decision. Therefore, the resolution of the Court of Appeals was modified. Respondent’s appeal to it was dismissed, allowing petitioner to still execute the order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court concerning her right to share in the conjugal properties.