G.R. No. L-14495. September 29, 1962.
VICENTE UY CHAO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DE LA RAMA STEAMSHIP CO., INC., defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Vicente Uy Chao filed a collection suit on February 11, 1958, to recover a sum for purchases made by De La Rama Steamship Co. between October and December 1941. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription, arguing the ten-year prescriptive period had lapsed. The plaintiff opposed, contending the running of prescription was interrupted by debt moratorium laws (Executive Orders and Republic Act No. 342 ). A key issue was whether the interruption lasted only until July 26, 1948 (RA 342’s enactment), or until May 18, 1953 (the Rutter vs. Esteban ruling), which depended on whether the defendant was a war sufferer who had filed a war damage claim—a fact not alleged in the complaint.
The trial court initially denied the motion to dismiss, finding the issue evidentiary. Upon reconsideration, it set a hearing for the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s status as a war sufferer. Before this hearing, the plaintiff served a written request for admission upon the defendant, asking it to admit it was a war sufferer who had filed a claim. The defendant moved to strike this request as premature, arguing it was improper before an answer was filed. At the hearing, the plaintiff presented no evidence other than this pending request. The court then dismissed the complaint, holding the burden of proof was on the plaintiff and that the request for admission was procedurally improper at that stage.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint based on prescription, considering the plaintiff’s pending request for admission regarding a crucial factual matter necessary to resolve the prescriptive period.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal orders. The legal logic centers on procedural rules and the proper determination of a motion to dismiss based on prescription. A motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the complaint’s allegations. While the complaint showed the cause of action arose in 1941, it did not conclusively establish prescription because it did not rule out the possibility the defendant was a war sufferer entitled to a longer moratorium under RA 342. This created a factual issue requiring evidence.
The Court held the trial court erred in strictly applying Rule 23, which states requests for admission should be made “after the pleadings are closed.” The purpose of this rule is to expedite trials by clarifying undisputed facts. When a motion to dismiss raises a factual issue that must be resolved to adjudicate the motion itself, the stage of proof for that specific issue is accelerated. The pleadings can be deemed closed for that limited purpose to allow the request for admission, preventing technicality from obstructing a just and speedy determination. The dismissal was improper because the ground of prescription was not indubitable; the court should have either allowed an amendment to the complaint or deferred the motion until trial. The case was remanded with instructions to compel the defendant to respond to the request for admission.