G.R. No. L-14436; March 21, 1960
HORACIO GUANZON, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO ARAGON, HON. GUILLERMO ROMEO, and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, respondents.

FACTS

On September 21, 1957, Francisco Aragon filed an ejectment case against Horacio Guanzon before the Justice of the Peace Court of Parañaque, Rizal. Guanzon filed his answer. After Aragon completed the presentation of his evidence, the trial was suspended and set for continuation on March 4, 1958, for Guanzon’s evidence. Guanzon’s counsel, Atty. Cesar Leuterio, was duly notified of this hearing. Neither Guanzon nor his counsel appeared on March 4, 1958, leading the court to consider the case submitted for decision. On April 30, 1958, the court rendered a decision ordering Guanzon to vacate the land, pay rentals and attorney’s fees, and declaring him a builder in bad faith. Guanzon’s counsel received a copy of the decision on June 11, 1958. After the decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued, and the sheriff scheduled a sale of Guanzon’s building. On August 6, 1958, Guanzon filed a petition for relief from judgment with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The lower court denied the petition, finding that the reasons alleged did not constitute excusable negligence. Guanzon appealed.
In his petition for relief, Guanzon alleged he was not notified of the March 4 hearing by the court or his counsel; he only learned of the decision on July 30, 1958, from the sheriff’s notice; and he was thus deprived of his day in court. He claimed a good defense: he built on the land based on a partnership contract with Pablo Lozada, who claimed ownership under an agreement with the Director of Lands, and the ownership issue was allegedly still pending between Aragon and Lozada in the Office of the President. His counsel, Atty. Leuterio, explained in an affidavit that after the initial hearing, Guanzon took the case papers to engage another lawyer (Atty. Tenza) for a mandamus case, leading Leuterio to believe his services were terminated. Upon receiving the hearing notice, he inquired if Atty. Tenza was also notified and, receiving an affirmative answer, deemed his appearance unnecessary. Upon receiving the decision copy, he failed to contact Guanzon directly and instead relayed the message through an employee, Ponciano Sevilla, who misplaced the note and failed to inform Guanzon promptly.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in denying Guanzon’s petition for relief from judgment on the ground that his and his counsel’s failure to attend the hearing did not constitute excusable negligence under Rule 38.

RULING

No, the trial court did not err. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition for relief. The Court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court. The failure of Guanzon’s counsel to notify him of the hearing and to appear was not excusable negligence. Notice to the counsel of record (Atty. Leuterio) was sufficient under the rules. Counsel’s assumption that he was relieved of his duties because Guanzon took the papers and engaged another lawyer for a separate case had no legal basis, as the proper modes for withdrawal under the Rules of Court were not followed. This constituted gross negligence. Furthermore, the Court noted that Guanzon’s alleged defense—relying on Lozada’s claim of ownership—was unsubstantial, as the administrative case between Lozada and Aragon had already been decided adversely to Lozada by the Office of the President prior to the filing of the petition for relief. Therefore, even if the case were reopened, the defense would not alter the ejectment decision. The granting of relief is discretionary, and there was no clear showing of abuse of discretion by the lower court.