G.R. No. L-14400; August 5, 1960
FELICISIMO GATMAITAN, administrator, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GORGONIO D. MEDINA, co-administrator, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Felicisimo Gatmaitan, the surviving spouse of the deceased Veronica Medina, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of her intestate estate. Gorgonio Medina and Dominica Medina, full-blooded siblings of the deceased, opposed and sought joint administration. The court appointed Gatmaitan as administrator and Gorgonio Medina as co-administrator without bond. Gatmaitan filed an amended inventory of the estate, but it was opposed by some heirs for allegedly omitting properties, leading the court to postpone its consideration. On April 2, 1957, the heirs filed a “Motion for Partial Partition and Distribution,” claiming the estate had no debts, the heirs were of legal age, and some were in need of cash. They prayed for partial distribution of palay produce and cash deposits. Without receiving evidence, the court issued an order on April 5, 1957, directing the administrator to advance ₱1,000 each to heirs Dominica Medina and Gorgonio Medina from the estate’s cash deposit and twenty-five cavans of palay each to all five heirs for subsistence, to be collated in the final distribution. Gatmaitan moved for reconsideration, denying he agreed to the distribution and arguing it was unwarranted and would cause difficulties. The motion was denied. Gatmaitan appealed, assigning as error the lower court’s grave abuse of discretion in ordering partial distribution without requiring the distributees to file bonds under Rule 91, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court gravely abused its discretion in ordering a partial distribution of the intestate estate without requiring the distributees to file the bonds mandated by Rule 91, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.

RULING

Yes, the lower court erred and gravely abused its discretion. The Supreme Court set aside the order of partial distribution. The Court emphasized that partial distribution of a decedent’s estate pending final proceedings should be discouraged and allowed only in extreme cases to protect creditors and ensure rightful heirs receive their shares. The order was unwarranted for three reasons:
1. Prematurity: At the time of the order, the amended inventory was not yet accepted due to an opposition, and notices for creditors’ claims had not been published, so the period for claims had not elapsed. The court lacked a sufficient basis for distribution, as the inventory showed conjugal assets without deductions for expenses, taxes, or probable debts, and there were multiple heirs claiming shares. Appellees, as siblings, were not entitled to support allowances under Rule 84, Section 3, which applies only to widows and children.
2. Absence of Bond: The court failed to require a bond as a condition precedent, as mandated by Rule 91, Section 1, which prohibits distribution unless obligations are paid or provided for, or distributees give a bond fixed by the court.
3. Lack of Agreement: Although the order suggested agreement, appellant promptly contested this, and the court did not categorically deny his claim. Appellees’ belated offer to file a bond was rejected by appellant and did not cure the defect, as the bond’s purpose is to protect all interested parties, including creditors, who were not consulted.
The records were remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, without prejudice to issuing a new order after strict compliance with the Rules. Costs were imposed on appellees.