G.R. No. L-14246; April 27, 1960
Tan Seng Pao, petitioner-appellee, vs. Commissioner of Immigration, et al., respondents-appellants.

FACTS

On July 30, 1958, petitioner Tan Seng Pao filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He alleged that on October 12, 1949, the respondent Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant for his arrest, leading to his custody. Deportation proceedings were instituted, resulting in a decision by the Board of Immigration Commissioners on February 1, 1950, convicting him and ordering his deportation. However, no steps were effectively taken to execute this deportation order, and he remained detained at the Immigration Detention Station. On May 8, 1958, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the deportation decision. Despite a follow-up on July 1, 1958, the respondent took no action on the motion. Petitioner contended that the non-execution of the deportation order and the unreasonable delay in acting on his motion rendered his continued detention illegal and the deportation order functus oficio.
The respondent Commissioner, in his return to the writ, stated that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was still pending, with one board member having already voted on it. Respondent argued that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing a petition for release on bail pending deportation and that any delay in deportation was due to ongoing diplomatic negotiations with petitioner’s country of origin, not government fault.
The lower court granted the petition on August 8, 1958, ordering petitioner’s release under surveillance and a bond, similar to conditions set in the Borovsky case. The respondent appealed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in granting the writ of habeas corpus, considering: (1) the pendency of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the Board of Immigration Commissioners; (2) petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies by not applying for bail; and (3) the reasonableness of petitioner’s continued detention given the delay in deportation.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and set aside the order granting petitioner’s release.
1. On the Pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration: The Court held that the filing of the habeas corpus petition was improper and premature. By submitting a motion for reconsideration to the Board of Immigration Commissioners, petitioner invoked the board’s authority to reconsider its decision. The deportation proceedings were therefore still pending. The Court cited Johnson vs. Commissioner of Immigration, stating that habeas corpus is premature if proceedings are pending before the Commissioner of Immigration, absent exceptional circumstances. No such circumstances were shown here, as the board had partly acted on the motion (one member had voted), and there was no claim of undue delay.
2. On Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: The Court found that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing a petition for release on bail with the respondent Commissioner while awaiting deportation. The possibility that respondent might require excessive bail was not a legal excuse for this failure.
3. On the Reasonableness of Continued Detention: The Court distinguished this case from prior cases like Mejoff and Borovsky, where habeas corpus was granted to stateless aliens detained for 2 to 4 years without a country willing to accept them. Here, petitioner is a Chinese citizen with a known country of origin (Formosa). The delay in deportation was attributed to diplomatic negotiations, not government fault or negligence. The Court held that as long as detention is not due to government fault and deportation is not impossible due to the deportee’s stateless status, the deportation warrant remains in force and should not be declared functus oficio. Granting release simply due to diplomatic delays would allow countries of undesirable aliens to frustrate deportation efforts.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision without pronouncement as to costs.