G.R. No. L-14246. April 27, 1960.
TAN SENG PAO, petitioner-appellee, vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, ET AL., respondents-appellants.

FACTS

On July 30, 1958, petitioner Tan Seng Pao filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Manila. He alleged that on October 12, 1949, the respondent Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant for his arrest, leading to his custody. Deportation proceedings were instituted, resulting in a decision by the Board of Immigration Commissioners on February 1, 1950, convicting him and ordering his deportation. However, no steps were taken to effectuate the deportation, and he remained detained at the Immigration Detention Station. On May 8, 1958, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision to address his “illegal continued detention.” After two months with no action on the motion, and following a follow-up on July 1, 1958, that also yielded no response, petitioner argued that the non-execution of the deportation order and the unreasonable delay rendered his detention unlawful and the order functus oficio. The respondent, in his return to the writ, stated that the motion for reconsideration was still pending (with one board member having already voted), and that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing a petition for release on bail. The respondent also attributed the delay in deportation to ongoing diplomatic negotiations with petitioner’s country of origin. The lower court granted the petition on August 8, 1958, ordering petitioner’s release under surveillance and a bond, similar to the conditions in the Borovsky case. The respondent appealed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in granting the writ of habeas corpus, considering the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the nature of the delay in deportation.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court. The Court held that the petition for habeas corpus was premature because petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the deportation decision was still pending before the Board of Immigration Commissioners at the time the petition was filed. Citing Johnson vs. Commissioner of Immigration, the Court ruled that habeas corpus is generally premature if proceedings are pending before the immigration authorities, and no exceptional circumstances were shown to justify judicial interference. Additionally, petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing a petition for release on bail with the respondent. On the issue of prolonged detention, the Court distinguished this case from prior cases involving stateless aliens (e.g., Mejoff, Borovsky), where deportation was impossible due to lack of a accepting country. Here, petitioner is a Chinese citizen with a known country of origin (Formosa), and the delay in deportation was due to diplomatic negotiations, not government fault or negligence. The Court concluded that as long as detention is not attributable to government fault and deportation is not rendered impossible by the alien’s statelessness, the deportation warrant remains valid and should not be declared functus oficio. The lower court’s decision and the order for release on bail pending appeal were set aside.