GR L 14204; (June, 1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-14204; June 30, 1961
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, vs. ROSALINDA DE LA PEÑA VDA. DE OLIVEROS, TUAZON, HIZON & OCAMPO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.
FACTS
The case involves a claim for death compensation filed by respondent widow, Rosalinda de la Peña Vda. de Oliveros, following the death of her husband, Napoleon Oliveros, a civil engineer. On January 9, 1955, Oliveros was killed while directing the construction of a bridge in Bacnotan, La Union, a project undertaken by respondent Tuazon, Hizon & Ocampo Construction Company for petitioner Manila Railroad Company (MRR). The contract stipulated that MRR would furnish the necessary materials while the contractor supplied the labor. MRR exercised close supervision over the construction to ensure compliance with contract specifications. The widow initially filed a claim against the contractor alone on or about January 20, 1955. She later filed an amended claim to include MRR as a respondent on September 20, 1956, which was served on MRR on October 2, 1956.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether petitioner MRR, as the principal engaging an independent contractor, is liable as a statutory employer for workmen’s compensation to the deceased employee of the contractor, and whether the claim is barred for being filed beyond the three-month period for notice of claim under Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, holding MRR liable. On the first issue, the Court applied the doctrine of statutory employment, citing the precedent set in Shellborne Hotel vs. De Leon. Since MRR was engaged in the business of railroad transportation, the construction of the bridge was integral and necessary to its business operations. Furthermore, MRR furnished the materials and exercised close supervision over the project. These circumstances made MRR the statutory employer of the deceased, rendering it solidarily liable with the direct contractor for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
On the second issue regarding the timeliness of the claim, the Court ruled that the claim was not barred. While Section 24 requires notice of a claim to be given within three months after death, the Court emphasized that this provision is not a statute of limitations but a notice requirement. Critically, the Court applied Section 27 of the same Act, which states that failure or delay in giving notice is not a bar if the employer had knowledge of the accident. The evidence established that MRR’s project engineer supervising the bridge construction knew of the fatal accident immediately, even notifying the Chief Train Dispatcher. Despite this knowledge, MRR failed to submit the employer’s report as required by Section 37. Therefore, MRR was deemed to have had sufficient knowledge, excusing the widow’s delay in formally amending her claim to include MRR. The defense of prejudice due to the passage of time was rejected.