G.R. No. L-1418; August 30, 1947
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF NUEVA ECIJA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA and FELICIANO VALDERAMA, respondents.

FACTS

An information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija charging Feliciano Valderama and several others (not yet apprehended) with the crime of robbery. The information alleged that on or about October 8, 1946, in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the accused, armed and conspiring, through violence and intimidation, took and carried away personal properties belonging to two individuals: Inocencio Mateo (valued at P61.00) and Leonides Pablo (valued at P39.00), totaling P100.00. Only Valderama was arraigned on March 4, 1947, and he pleaded not guilty. During the trial, after the prosecution’s first witness (Leonides Pablo) testified, the prosecution called a second witness (Emerenciana de San Jose) to prove the robbery in the house of Inocencio Mateo. The defense counsel objected to this testimony on the ground that it tended to prove a second robbery, arguing that the information charged more than one offense (duplicity). The respondent judge issued an order requiring the Provincial Fiscal to elect which of the two alleged robberies to prosecute, holding that the duplicity was not clearly apparent on the face of the information and, therefore, the accused had not waived the objection by failing to move to quash before pleading.

ISSUE

Whether the accused, by not moving to quash the information on the ground of duplicity before pleading, waived all objections based on that ground under Rule 113, Section 10 of the Rules of Court.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus. The Court held that under Rule 113, Section 10, if the defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before pleading, he shall be taken to have waived all objections that are grounds for a motion to quash, except when the information does not charge an offense or the court lacks jurisdiction. This rule is mandatory and represents a radical innovation from the old procedure under General Orders No. 58, aiming for a speedier trial. The Court emphasized that the waiver is effective immediately upon failure to move to quash before pleading, and the trial judge has no discretion to rule otherwise. Consequently, the respondent judge was ordered to proceed with the trial, including allowing the testimony of the second witness, and to continue the proceedings to final judgment. The Court explicitly declined to decide whether the information actually charged two offenses, as the waiver issue was dispositive. No costs were awarded.