G.R. No. L-13994; April 29, 1961
VALERIO P. TRIA, in substitution of MARIANO B. DELGADO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WENCESLAO A. LIRAG, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Mariano B. Delgado filed an action against Wenceslao A. Lirag for violating the terms of a deed of sale over a parcel of land. During the proceedings, the parties entered into a compromise agreement, which was submitted to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for approval. The agreement stipulated that the original deed of sale would be rescinded, and Delgado would pay Lirag P13,500 on or before December 31, 1955, after which Lirag would reconvey the land. A critical condition allowed Delgado to sell or mortgage the land to raise the payment, but only with Lirag’s consent; any disagreement on this matter was to be settled by the court. The court approved the agreement and rendered a judgment incorporating its terms.
Delgado later assigned his rights to Valerio P. Tria, who substituted him as plaintiff. Tria failed to pay the P13,500 by the stipulated deadline. Consequently, Lirag filed a motion for execution, which the court granted in an order dated June 5, 1956. Tria did not appeal this order. After an initial writ proved ineffective, an alias writ of execution was issued in 1958. Tria then filed a motion to lift the alias writ, arguing that his failure to pay was due to Lirag’s alleged refusal to lend the certificate of title and sign necessary documents to facilitate a mortgage, thereby breaching the agreement.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in denying Tria’s motion to lift the alias writ of execution based on his claim that Lirag’s breach of the compromise agreement prevented his payment.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding the alias writ of execution was proper. The Court rejected Tria’s defense that Lirag’s actions prevented his compliance. The compromise agreement explicitly provided a remedy for any disagreement regarding the mortgage: submission to the court for resolution. Tria never invoked this judicial recourse. Furthermore, correspondence from Tria’s counsel after the deadline merely requested a payment extension without alleging Lirag’s obstruction, undermining the claim’s credibility.
Critically, the Court emphasized the finality of the order granting the initial execution. Tria received notice, opposed it, and yet allowed the June 5, 1956 order to become final by not appealing. He raised the alleged breach only over a year later upon the issuance of the alias writ, which was too late to challenge the execution’s propriety. Finally, the Court dispelled Tria’s argument that the agreement was merely a contract enforceable only by a separate action. The compromise was judicially approved and incorporated into the court’s decision, making it a judgment that could be enforced directly by a writ of execution under Article 2037 of the Civil Code. Thus, no reversible error was committed by the lower court.