G.R. No. L-13968. October 31, 1962.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ILDEFONSO CORTEZ, ET AL., defendants, ALEJO UY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

An information for murder was filed against Alejo Uy and others for the death of Librado Pascual during a dance in Reina Mercedes, Isabela. The prosecution established that a fistfight erupted after Sergio Pataueg struck a person trying to manage the crowd. When the Pascual brothers intervened and fled after the fight, Uy, Pataueg, and Sacang rushed towards Librado Pascual, who was standing with his arms crossed. Pataueg clubbed Librado from behind. As Librado turned to face him, Sacang hacked him on the head. Uy then stabbed Librado in the chest with a dagger. The victim was taken to a clinic where, conscious of impending death, he gave an ante mortem statement identifying Uy and Pataueg as his assailants. He died shortly thereafter from the stab wound.
At trial, the trial court convicted Uy of murder qualified by treachery. The defense presented a witness, Domingo Paual, who claimed he was the actual stabber. The court found Paual’s confession unworthy of credence, noting it was made years after the incident, was inconsistent with his claim of being attacked from behind, and was unsupported by other evidence. The credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses was upheld, as no ill motive for their testimony was shown.

ISSUE

Whether the crime committed by appellant Alejo Uy is murder qualified by treachery or homicide.

RULING

The Supreme Court modified the judgment, finding Uy guilty of homicide, not murder. The legal logic centered on the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia). For treachery to qualify a killing as murder, the means of execution must be deliberately adopted by the offender to ensure the act’s success without risk to themselves from any defense the victim might make. The Court, agreeing with the Solicitor General, found that at the moment Uy stabbed the victim, Librado Pascual was already under a concerted attack by Pataueg and Sacang and was actively trying to defend himself. Thus, Uy’s act, while sudden, did not employ a method deliberately chosen to render the victim defenseless; the victim’s vulnerable position was incidental to the ongoing assault, not a deliberately contrived situation.
However, the Court held that the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was present. Although not alleged in the information, it could be appreciated as it was established by the evidence. The aggressors, Uy included, possessed numerical superiority and were all armed against a weaponless victim. With this aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the penalty was imposed in its maximum period. The Court sentenced Uy to an indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and upheld the indemnity to the heirs.